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THE ECONOMICS OF WEAPONIZED 
DEFAMATION LAWSUITS 
 
David J. Acheson  Dr. Ansgar Wohlschlegel.  
INTRODUCTION 
The law of defamation is the principal legal mechanism in both the 
United States and England for protecting the interest in reputation.1  It 
entitles plaintiffs to a remedy, typically money damages, to compensate for 
reputational harm caused by defendants’ publication of false and 
defamatory imputations about them.2 
Strictly speaking, defamation law rarely protects the plaintiff’s 
reputation against a defamatory publication, at least not directly.  In both 
jurisdictions, courts are unlikely to award pre-publication injunctions to 
prevent a defamatory allegation from being made.3  As such, it is more 
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the editors of the Southwestern Law Review for their excellent work. 
 1.  The word “defamation” refers to a combination of two torts – libel and slander – both of 
which protect plaintiffs’ reputations.  The distinction between the torts lies in the medium of 
publication: slander relates to publications made in a transient form (typically spoken); libel to 
publications made in a permanent form (typically written or broadcast).  In most jurisdictions, it is 
more difficult for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case in slander than in libel.  For the 
purpose of this paper, we ignore the tort of slander, and the words “libel” and “defamation” are 
used interchangeably: our focus is on publications made by journalists, which will typically be 
classified as libel.   
 2.  A statement is “defamatory” in U.S. law “if it tends so to harm the reputation of another 
as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or 
dealing with him.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).  The main 
test in English law is similar: a statement is “defamatory” if it “tend[s] to lower the plaintiff in the 
estimation of right-thinking members of society generally.”  Sim v. Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237 
(HL) 1240. 
 3.  See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); CBS, Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315 (1994).  
Bonnard v. Perryman [1891] 2 Ch. 269 (CA) (Eng.). 
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accurate to say that defamation law provides a remedy to a plaintiff whose 
reputation has already been harmed by the defendant. 
However, one of the overarching goals of defamation law, in addition 
to remedying reputational harm already suffered, ought to be to produce 
incentives that deter publishers from unlawfully causing such harm in the 
first place.  Compensating wrongly caused injuries through the courts is an 
imperfect mechanism that imposes costs on individual litigants as well as 
on the public, and is therefore less desirable than preventing those injuries 
from being caused at all.  Just as an effective legal regime dealing with car 
accidents would deter drivers from creating a risk of injury to others by 
driving recklessly, defamation law should seek to prevent unwarranted 
reputational harm. 
However, in seeking to prevent injuries, the law may in practice over-
deter behavior, causing people to refrain from conduct that is lawful as well 
as from conduct that is unlawful.4  This phenomenon is known as the 
“chilling effect.”5  In the context of defamation, the chilling effect occurs 
when the law deters the publication of statements that would not be 
actionable, for example because they are true.6  Deterrence may be caused 
by a number of factors but is driven in particular by the potential cost of 
liability and prospective defendants’ uncertainty as to the outcome of any 
litigation that might result from their publications.7 
Over-deterrence of lawful behavior is generally undesirable.  But in the 
area of defamation, the deterred behavior – speech – is not only lawful, but 
also constitutionally protected.8 As such, over-deterrence is of greater 
concern than it would be in other legal contexts.  Speech on matters of 
public interest generates social benefits that are lost when the law causes 
publishers to be overly cautious.9 
As well as causing a general over-cautiousness on the part of 
publishers, the chilling effect of defamation law can be leveraged in specific 
instances by public figures to stifle legitimate criticism, to punish media 
 
 4.  See Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the “Chilling 
Effect”, 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 693 (1978). 
 5.  Id. at 685. 
 6.  See id. at 693. 
 7.  See id. at 687-88. 
 8.  U.S. CONST. amend. I.  In England, although no written constitution exists, freedom of 
speech is protected under the European Convention on Human Rights, art. 10, as applied in 
English law by the Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42.  The Human Rights Act is considered by the 
courts to be a “constitutional statute.”  Thoburn v. Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 
(Admin) 195 [62], [2003] QB 151 (Eng.).  See David Feldman, The Nature and Significance of 
“Constitutional” Legislation, 129 L.Q. REV. 343 (2013).  
 9.  Schauer, supra note 4, at 691. 
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organizations for perceived slights, or to achieve some other objective for 
which the law is not primarily designed.10  These lawsuits will be referred 
to here as “weaponized” defamation suits, and their particular effects will 
be our focus, alongside discussion of the chilling effect more generally. 
The recognition that defamation law can have a chilling effect on 
important expression has been influential in the development of the tort 
across the common law world.  In England, the courts’ development of an 
absolute privilege for statements defamatory of government bodies,11 and of 
a defence applicable to publications on subjects of public interest,12 were 
both influenced to some extent by chilling effect reasoning.  Recent 
statutory reforms to defamation law were driven in large part by concern 
about the chilling of important expression.13  In the U.S., the 
constitutionalization of the defamation torts in New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, and the Supreme Court’s imposition in that case of an “actual 
malice” fault standard on claims brought by public officials, were also a 
response to the perceived chilling effect of the common law.14  In Justice 
Brennan’s judgment, under the common law: 
[W]ould-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their 
criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is, in 
fact, true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the 
expense of having to do so. . . . The [common law’s strict liability] rule 
thus dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate.15 
Chilling effect reasoning has also had a role in the development of the 
law in Australia,16 New Zealand,17 Canada,18 and elsewhere,19 as well as 
influencing the supranational European Court of Human Rights in its 
interpretation of the obligations imposed on signatory states with respect to 
 
 10.  See infra Sections IV.B, IV.C. 
 11.  Derbyshire CC v. Times Newspapers Ltd. [1993] AC 534 (HL) 548 (appeal taken from 
Eng.). 
 12.  Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd. [2001] 2 AC 127 (HL) 202 (appeal taken from 
Eng.).   
 13.  Defamation Act 2013, c. 26 (Eng.).  See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, DRAFT DEFAMATION 
BILL: CONSULTATION, 2011, Cm 8020, at 5 (UK). 
 14.  N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). 
 15.  Id. at 279. 
 16.  Theophanus v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd. [1994] HCA 46, [29]-[34] (Austl.). 
 17.  Lange v. Atkinson (no. 2) [2000] NZCA 95 at [24] (N.Z.). 
 18.  Grant v. Torstar Corp. [2009] 3 S.C.R. 640, para. 53 (Can.). 
 19.  Similar reasoning has also been employed by courts in Germany’s civil law system.  
ERIC BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 218 (2d ed. 2005).  See also Kyu Ho Youm, “Actual 
Malice” in U.S. Defamation Law: The Minority of One Doctrine in the World?, 4 J. INT’L MEDIA 
& ENT. L. 1, 2 (2011) (discussing the influence of the Sullivan doctrine in a variety of other 
jurisdictions). 
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the right to freedom of expression.20  All of these legal developments or 
reforms shifted the balance of defamation law in their respective 
jurisdictions towards greater protection for freedom of expression, 
necessarily at the expense of protection for the individual interest in 
reputation. 
The chilling effect theory, put simply, asserts that defamation law 
creates sub-optimal incentives.  As such, legal responses to the problem 
have sought to increase incentives to publish speech on matters of public 
interest, and thereby to move defamation law in the direction of more 
optimal incentives.  These legal responses, in other words, “have been 
explicitly motivated by consequential concerns.”21 In deciding Sullivan, for 
example, the Supreme Court “intended . . . to reduce the extent of self-
censorship caused by the common law’s strict liability approach.”22 
But there has been substantial debate over whether the various reform 
options chosen in response to concerns about the chilling effect are actually 
effective in optimizing the incentives created by defamation law.23  In the 
U.S., some commentators have argued that the “actual malice” rule 
developed in Sullivan has had unforeseen negative consequences on press 
freedom.24  Similar criticisms were made of the application by English 
courts of the public interest defence created by the House of Lords in 
Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd.25  As David Hollander has pointed out, 
if the Sullivan rule, or its equivalent in another jurisdiction, does not 
encourage socially beneficial expression as intended, “then its only effect is 
to shift part of the burden of producing news onto private shoulders, 
without any accompanying benefit.”26 
In assessing the incentives created by defamation law, and the likely 
effects of proposed reforms on those incentives, economic analysis can be 
useful: economics “provide[s] a scientific theory to predict the effects of 
legal sanctions on behavior.”27  The goal of this paper is to draw on existing 
 
 20.  Tønsbergs Blad AS v. Norway, App. No. 510/04, para. 102 (2007); Indep. News & 
Media v. Ireland, App. No. 55120/00, para. 114 (2005). 
 21.  Oren Bar-Gill & Assaf Hamdani, Optimal Liability for Libel, Contributions to Economic 
Analysis & Policy, 2 B.E.J. OF ECON. & POL’Y 1 (2003). 
 22.  Alain Sheer & Asghar Zardkoohi, Is the Law of Defamation as it Relates to Public 
Officials and Public Figures Economically Efficient?, in THE COST OF LIBEL: ECONOMIC AND 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 207 (Everette E. Dennis & Eli M. Noam eds., 1989). 
 23.  See infra Sections II.C, II.D, Part III. 
 24.  See infra notes 119-29 and accompanying text. 
 25.  See infra notes 130-40 and accompanying text. 
 26.  David A. Hollander, The Economics of Libel Litigation, in THE COST OF LIBEL, supra 
note 22, at 260. 
 27.  ROBERT B. COOTER, JR. & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 3 (6th ed. 2014). 
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law and economics literature assessing defamation law, in addition to our 
own economic model of libel litigation,28 to see what lessons can be learned 
about the effect of various reforms on the incentives induced by the law.  
Our analysis focuses in particular on the effect of weaponized defamation 
lawsuits by introducing the perceived litigiousness of public figures as a 
factor that may influence publication decisions.  We focus on the legal 
regimes applicable in the United States and England, as the distinctions 
between these systems provide interesting points of contrast in respect of 
both substantive and procedural defamation law. 
The structure of the rest of this paper is as follows.  Part I provides an 
overview of U.S. and English libel laws, focusing on the ways in which 
they have diverged from their shared common law origins in response to 
concerns about the chilling effect.  Part II analyses those concerns, and the 
substantive reforms that have been motivated by them, within the 
framework of economic theory.  Part III discusses the impact of litigation 
costs on the chilling effect and on the effectiveness of the reforms discussed 
in Part II.  Part IV considers the factors that influence plaintiffs’ litigation 
incentives, with a particular focus on the weaponization of defamation 
lawsuits by public figures seeking to deter future criticism of their conduct.  
After a brief conclusion in Part V, Part VI suggests some tentative links 
between the discussion in this paper and the second subject of this 
Symposium, the phenomenon of “fake news.” 
I. RESPONSES TO THE CHILLING EFFECT IN THE U.S. AND ENGLAND 
Before the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1964 decision in Sullivan, defamation 
laws in the U.S. and England were broadly the same.29  Both were based on 
the English common law, which was notably plaintiff-friendly in several 
respects.30  The Sullivan decision marks the most significant point of 
divergence between the two legal systems.31  In response to concerns about 
the common law’s potential to chill expression, it fundamentally altered 
aspects of American defamation law that remained unchanged on the other 
side of the Atlantic.32  Although those same concerns did later lead to legal 
 
 28.  David J. Acheson & Ansgar Wohlschlegel, Libel Bullies, Defamation Victims and 
Litigation Incentives, PORTSMOUTH BUS. SCHOOL ECON. & FIN. (2018). 
 29.  Russell L. Weaver & David F. Partlett, Defamation, Free Speech, and Democratic 
Governance, 50 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 57, 57-58 (2005). 
 30.  Id. at 57. 
 31.  See Andrew T. Kenyon & Megan Richardson, Reverberations of Sullivan? Considering 
Defamation and Privacy Law Reform, in COMPARATIVE DEFAMATION AND PRIVACY LAW 331-32 
(Andrew T. Kenyon ed., 2016). 
 32.  See id. at 333. 
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developments in England as well, the English reforms have been more 
limited than their American counterparts.33  This Part first describes the 
most relevant plaintiff-friendly features of the common law, then outlines 
the responses to the chilling effect problem that have altered that common 
law approach in both the U.S. and England.  The descriptions of the law 
given here are necessarily brief and incomplete; their purpose is to 
contextualize the discussion that follows about the impact of various 
aspects of defamation law on incentives. 
A. The Common Law 
A series of legal presumptions operated in favor of the plaintiff in the 
common law action: the presumptions of malice, falsity, and harm.  These 
presumptions, taken together, illustrate the plaintiff-friendly nature of the 
common law and explain the perception that the law risked imposing an 
unacceptable chill on speech.34 
1. Presumption of Malice 
At common law, outside of occasions of qualified privilege,35 the 
motive or intention of the defendant was not relevant to liability.36  As such, 
defamation was essentially a strict liability tort: the defendant did not need 
to have acted with any degree of fault to be held liable.37  In general, the 
presumption of malice was irrebuttable: it was not a defence to a 
defamation claim for the defendant to prove the absence of fault.38  Even a 
defendant who was unaware of the plaintiff’s existence at the time of 
publication would have no defence on that basis to a defamation action.39 
 
 33.  See id. at 331. 
 34.  Other factors also played a part in generating this perception, including, for example, the 
unpredictability caused by the use of juries in defamation trials and their tendency to make large 
damages awards.  GEOFFREY ROBERTSON & ANDREW NICOL, MEDIA LAW § 3-079, 3-081 (5th 
ed. 2008); Marlene Arnold Nicholson, McLibel: A Case Study in English Defamation Law, 18 
WIS. INT’L L.J. 1, 34 (2000).  The presumptions described here were probably the most important 
features of the common law in this context, and are the most relevant to the discussion in this 
paper. 
 35.  A qualified privilege can be rebutted if the plaintiff shows that the defendant published 
the statement with malice.  See Paul Mitchell, Duties, Interests, and Motives: Privileged 
Occasions in Defamation, 18 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 381 (1998). 
 36.  Campbell v. Spottiswoode (1863) 122 Eng. Rep. 288; 3 B. & S. 769 (QB) 781. 
 37.  RICHARD PARKES ET AL., GATLEY ON LIBEL AND SLANDER § 1.8 (12th ed. 2013). 
 38.  Eric Descheemaeker, Protecting Reputation: Defamation and Negligence, 29 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. 629 (2009). 
 39.  Jones v. E. Hulton & Co. [1909] 2 KB 444 (CA) 454, 455. 
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2. Presumption of Falsity 
Once the plaintiff had established that the statement complained of was 
defamatory,40 the law would presume its falsity.  In other words, although 
the remedy in defamation is for the reputational harm caused by false and 
defamatory imputations, plaintiffs did not actually need to establish their 
falsity in court.  Instead, the burden was on the defendant to prove the truth 
of the statement complained of, or plead another defence, in order to avoid 
liability.41 
3. Presumption of Harm 
The final relevant presumption is that of harm.  Once a statement was 
held to be defamatory, its publication was presumed to have harmed the 
plaintiff’s reputation.42  In contrast to most other torts, defamation law did 
not require a plaintiff to identify and prove an injury that had in fact been 
caused by the defendant’s wrong.43  Further, the presumption of harm meant 
that, once liability was established, damages were “at large”; that is, the 
quantum of damages was not limited to compensating actual injuries proven 
by the plaintiff.44 
The presumption of harm, as with the presumption of malice, was 
irrebuttable in most cases.  In general, evidence that the plaintiff had either 
suffered minimal harm to reputation, or had no good reputation to protect,45 
went to the quantum of damages rather than to liability.46 
Together, these presumptions made it comparatively simple for 
defamation plaintiffs to make good their claims.  To establish liability 
(subject to defences) all plaintiffs needed to prove was that the defendant 
had published to a third party a statement that was defamatory of them.47  In 
claims against media defendants, which by definition publish statements to 
third parties and which almost always directly name the subjects of their 
reporting, in effect a plaintiff needed only to establish that the statement 
 
 40.  See supra note 2 for definitions of the word “defamatory.” 
 41.  See Elizabeth Samson, The Burden to Prove Libel: A Comparative Analysis of 
Traditional English and U.S. Defamation Laws and the Dawn of England’s Modern Day, 20 
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 771, 776 (2012). 
 42.  This presumption did not apply in cases of slander not actionable per se, but these are a 
relatively small subset of defamation claims overall and are not the concern of this article. 
 43.  Hough v. London Express [1940] 2 KB 507 (CA). 
 44.  Broome v. Cassell & Co. [1972] AC 1027 (HL) 1071. 
 45.  E.g., Polanski v. Condé Nast Publications Ltd. [2005] UKHL 10. 
 46.  Scott v. Sampson [1882] 8 QBD 491. 
 47.  Samson, supra note 41, at 776. 
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complained of was “defamatory”.48  From there, liability and an entitlement 
to more than nominal damages was effectively presumed unless the 
defendant could plead and prove a defence to the action. 
B. U.S. Divergence from the Common Law 
David Anderson has noted that “[a]lthough the American law of 
defamation has descended from that of England, it has diverged so greatly 
that nowadays the resemblance is largely superficial.”49  The divergence of 
U.S. law from the English common law has its genesis in the Supreme 
Court’s Sullivan decision,50 which made far-reaching changes to the law of 
defamation by bringing it within the scope of the First Amendment.51 
The Sullivan case arose from a libel suit brought by an elected official 
in Montgomery, Alabama, in respect of criticism of the handling of civil 
rights protests by police in the city.52  The Court’s decision was likely 
influenced by the fact that Sullivan’s claim could fairly be characterized as 
a weaponized lawsuit against the New York Times.53  Anthony Lewis has 
described the suit as having been used as “a state political weapon to 
intimidate the press.”54  The Court’s decision to subject the state court’s 
verdict to independent review after having found it unconstitutional, rather 
than to remand the case for a retrial, was intended to ensure that the suit 
“was not then used further to harass [the] defendants.”55 
The most prominent change made to the law of defamation in Sullivan 
was the imposition of an “actual malice” fault standard, in place of the 
common law’s strict liability approach, on claims brought by public 
officials.56  Under that standard, a defendant will not be liable unless the 
plaintiff can prove, with “convincing clarity,”57 that the statement was 
 
 48.  See FRANCES QUINN, LAW FOR JOURNALISTS 232, 236 (5th ed. 2015). 
 49.  David A. Anderson, Defamation and Privacy: An American Perspective, in SIMON 
DEAKIN, ANGUS JOHNSTON & BASIL MARKESINIS, MARKESINIS AND DEAKIN’S TORT LAW 866 
(6th ed. 2008). 
 50.  N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 51.  The Court had previously suggested that libelous statements did not attract the protection 
of the First Amendment.  Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
 52.  Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256. 
 53.  ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
35 (1991). 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. at 159 (quoting Former U.S. Attorney General William P. Rogers, who represented 
other defendants in the case). 
 56.  Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80. 
 57.  Id. at 285-86.  This is obviously a higher standard of proof than the “preponderance of 
evidence” or “balance of probabilities” standards normally used in civil claims. 
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published “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of 
whether it was false or not.”58  As Kyu Ho Youm notes, the use of the 
actual malice standard rather than strict liability “is often what makes U.S. 
law stand out from the rest of the world.”59 
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions expanded the constitutional 
privilege created in Sullivan.  The requirement to prove actual malice was 
extended from public official plaintiffs to “public figures” in Curtis 
Publishing Co. v. Butts.60  Despite an earlier plurality opinion suggesting 
that the standard should apply to all statements on subjects of public 
interest,61 the Court established different constitutional requirements for 
claims brought by private figures in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.62  In those 
claims, states could permissibly impose a more exacting standard of care on 
defendants, although they must require the plaintiff to prove at least 
negligence: the common law strict liability standard would be 
unconstitutional in this context as well.63  The Gertz Court also limited the 
availability of presumed and punitive damages to plaintiffs proving actual 
malice; plaintiffs proving only negligence were limited to obtaining 
compensation for actual injury.64  As a result of this line of cases, the 
presumption of malice no longer operates in U.S. law; the plaintiff must 
prove that the defendant was at least negligent.65  Similarly, the plaintiff is 
no longer entitled to presumed damages absent proof of malice.66 
The Court has also dispensed with the common law presumption of 
falsity in claims brought by public figures and those brought by private 
figures in respect of public issues.67  Rather than placing the onus on 
defendants to plead and prove the truth of their statements, U.S. law now 
requires these plaintiffs to prove their falsity in order to establish liability.68  
As such, the most plaintiff-friendly elements of the common law action are 
now constitutionally prohibited in the majority of U.S. defamation claims. 
 
 58.  Id. at 280. 
 59.  Youm, supra note 19, at 2. 
 60.  Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967). 
 61.  Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 59 (1971). 
 62.  Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
 63.  Id. at 346-48. 
 64.  See id. at 349. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  See Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 52. 
 67.  Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777-78 (1986). 
 68.  Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974). 
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C. More Limited Developments in English Law 
In contrast, English law has retained most of the elements of the 
common law abandoned by the Sullivan Court.  It has developed over the 
last few decades to increase the protection offered to speech, but in a more 
limited way than American law. 
Despite various calls for the presumption of falsity to be discarded in 
English law,69 it has been retained.  As such, truth remains a defence to a 
claim in defamation.70  Likewise, the presumption of malice has been 
retained, and defamation remains “[f]undamentally . . . a tort of strict 
liability.”71 
The most important and relevant response to concerns about the 
chilling effect of English law has been the creation and subsequent 
liberalization of a defence protecting statements on subjects of public 
interest.  The defence was established by the House of Lords in Reynolds v. 
Times Newspapers Ltd.72  It was intended to better facilitate the flow of 
information on subjects of public interest and in effect immunized 
statements on such subjects from liability, even if they were false, provided 
that they were published responsibly.73  Whether the defendant had acted 
with the requisite degree of responsibility was decided according to the 
circumstances of each case, but the judgment of Lord Nicholls set out a list 
of ten factors considered likely to be relevant to that decision.74 
 
 69.  ENGLISH PEN & INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, FREE SPEECH IS NOT FOR SALE: THE IMPACT 
OF ENGLISH LIBEL LAW ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (2009), https://www.scribd.com/document/ 
71553250/Free-Speech-is-Not-For-Sale; DARIO MILO, DEFAMATION AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
183-84 (Oxford U. Press 2008); Samson, supra note 41, at 783-84. 
 70.  Defamation Act 2013, c. 26, § 2 (Eng.). 
 71.  PARKES, supra note 37, at § 1.8. 
 72.  Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd. [2001] 2 AC 127 (HL) 193 (appeal taken from 
Eng.). 
 73.  Eric Descheemaeker, A Man Must Take Care Not to Defame His Neighbour: The 
Origins and Significance of the Defence of Responsible Publication, 34 U. OF QUEENSL. L.J. 239, 
239 (2015). 
 74.  Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd. [2001] 2 AC 127 (HL) 193, 205 (appeal taken from 
Eng.).  The ten factors as laid out by Lord Nicholls:  
1.The seriousness of the allegation.  The more serious the charge, the more the public is 
misinformed and the individual harmed, if the allegation is not true.  2. The nature of 
the information, and the extent to which the subject matter is a matter of public 
concern.  3. The source of the information. Some informants have no direct knowledge 
of the events. Some have their own axes to grind, or are being paid for their stories.  4. 
The steps taken to verify the information.  5. The status of the information.  The 
allegation may have already been the subject of an investigation which commands 
respect.  6. The urgency of the matter.  News is often a perishable commodity.  7. 
Whether comment was sought from the plaintiff.  He may have information others do 
not possess or have not disclosed.  An approach to the plaintiff will not always be 
necessary.  8. Whether the article contained the gist of the plaintiff’s side of the story.  
9. The tone of the article.  A newspaper can raise queries or call for an investigation.  It 
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Although an important development in the law, the Reynolds defence 
was less effective than hoped in addressing the chilling effect.75  As such, 
Parliament repealed the defence in the Defamation Act 2013 and replaced it 
with a more open-textured statutory public interest defence, intended to be 
applied more flexibly in the courts.76  Section 4 of the 2013 Act provides 
that a defendant can avoid liability for defamation by showing that: 
a) the statement complained of was, or formed part of, a statement on a 
matter of public interest; and 
b) the defendant reasonably believed that publishing the statement 
complained of was in the public interest.77 
In Reynolds, the House of Lords effectively introduced a fault standard 
– irresponsibility – in defamation claims brought in respect of certain kinds 
of statements; this element of fault has been retained in the section 4 
defence, although it is now described as “unreasonableness.”78  But both the 
section 4 and Reynolds defences differ from the Sullivan fault standard in 
that the burden is on defendants to prove they did not act with the requisite 
level of fault.79  Under the Sullivan rule, in contrast, the onus is on the 
plaintiff to prove the defendant’s fault.80 
In addition to broadening the Reynolds defence, the Defamation Act 
2013 made what might have been a further important change to the 
common law, by requiring a plaintiff to show that the defendant’s statement 
“has caused or is likely to cause serious harm to the [plaintiff’s] 
reputation.”81  This provision, in section 1 of the Act, was initially 
interpreted as having effectively abolished the common law presumption of 
harm.82 
However, the provision was poorly drafted.83  Despite its initial 
appearance, the most authoritative interpretation to date, from the Court of 
Appeal, entails that the common law presumption of harm still applies in 
 
need not adopt allegations as statements of fact. 10. The circumstances of the 
publication, including the timing. 
Id. 
 75.  See infra notes 130-40 and accompanying text. 
 76.  Defamation Act 2013, c. 26, § 4 (Eng.). 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Descheemaeker, supra note 38, at 603, 625, 639. 
 79.  Samson, supra note 41, at 782. 
 80.  N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 267, 271 (1964). 
 81.  Defamation Act 2013, c. 26, § 1 (Eng.). 
 82.  Lachaux v. Indep. Print Ltd. [2015] EWHC (QB) 2242 [60] (Eng.). 
 83.  See generally Eric Descheemaeker, Three Errors in the Defamation Act 2013, 6 J. EUR. 
TORT L. 24 (2015) [hereinafter Descheemaeker, Three Errors]. 
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English law.84  Although it may still be of some use to defendants, the effect 
of section 1 is now likely to be limited to providing courts with a 
strengthened mechanism for the early resolution of weaker claims. 
The protection of speech in English defamation law has been enhanced 
by the above developments, but “in substantive terms the balance remains 
very different from in the US,”85 with stronger protection still provided to 
the interest in reputation in England. 
These significant changes to both U.S. and English defamation law 
have been driven largely by concern over the law’s chilling effect on 
expression and have sought to better optimize the incentives induced by the 
law.  As such, they can reasonably be assessed by reference to their effects 
on those incentives.  Part II discusses the contribution that economic 
analysis can make to assessing the consequences of the distinct libel 
regimes in each jurisdiction. 
II. ECONOMIC ANALYSES OF DEFAMATION LAW 
The economics literature focusing specifically on the law of 
defamation is relatively sparse.  Its focus is generally on the effects of the 
different standards of fault that might be required for a finding of liability, 
particularly comparing strict liability with the Sullivan actual malice 
standard.  In line with the Sullivan Court’s overarching concern with the 
chilling effect, most literature focuses on media organizations’ incentives to 
publish statements that risk attracting liability in defamation.86  As will be 
described below, however, these are not the only variables and incentives 
that have interested economists. 
The discussion in this Part starts with an insight from the economics 
literature into the wider public importance of the chilling effect, especially 
in the context of lawsuits brought by public officials.  We then discuss the 
economics of defamation law and the chilling effect as framed by the 
Sullivan Court, before considering criticisms of the Court’s reasoning found 
in the law and economics literature. 
A. Public Figures and the Press as Watchdog 
As discussed above, the Sullivan case was brought by a public official 
in relation to allegations about his official conduct.87  The Supreme Court 
 
 84.  Lachaux v. Indep. Print Ltd. [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1334 [72], [82] (Eng.). 
 85.  Kenyon & Richardson, supra note 31, at 348. 
 86.  See infra Section II.B. 
 87.  N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256-57 (1964). 
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was partly motivated by the particular dangers associated with this kind of 
lawsuit.88  One way in which these concerns can be understood is to 
recognize that the choice of legal rules used to resolve defamation disputes 
has important ramifications that go beyond the immediate outcomes of 
lawsuits.  Of particular importance in respect of public official plaintiffs is 
the effect of the law in either facilitating or obstructing the press’s role in 
scrutinizing their conduct, acting as a “watchdog” for the public.89  
Economic analysis can help highlight the mechanisms through which these 
effects operate. 
In two closely related papers, Nuno Garoupa uses economic theory to 
investigate libel law’s “implications for the existence of dishonesty in a 
society in which the media can influence social behavior.”90  He analyses 
the effect of various features of the law on public figures’ incentives to act 
dishonestly or corruptly, and on the accuracy of news stories about public 
figures.91 
One important insight that is reflected in Garoupa’s analysis is that the 
law of defamation can influence public figures’ decisions about whether or 
not to engage in wrongdoing, as well as influencing the media’s publication 
decisions and both parties’ litigation outcomes.92  The basic incentive for 
public figures to do wrong – whatever benefit that they would obtain from 
the wrongdoing – is independent of defamation law.  But when deciding 
whether to do wrong, a public figure also needs to take into account the 
likelihood that she will be exposed by the media and the harm that she 
would suffer if she is exposed.  She would further need to consider the 
possibility of recovering some of the loss from being exposed through a 
defamation suit, taking into account her likelihood of success in court and 
the magnitude of the payoff that she could expect if successful.  Defamation 
law obviously influences both of these factors, in addition to affecting the 
media’s publication incentives, and therefore the probability of wrongdoing 
being exposed.  As such, a public figure’s expectations as to what might 
follow her wrongdoing will depend in part on the applicable libel laws.  
Although defamation law has no direct effect on wrongdoing incentives, it 
will influence a public figure’s decision whether or not to do wrong – in a 
 
 88.  See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text. 
 89.  See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, AM. B. FOUND. 
RES. J. 521, 572 (1977). 
 90.  Nuno Garoupa, Dishonesty and Libel Law: The Economics of the “Chilling” Effect, 155 
J. INSTITUTIONAL STUD. 284, 286 (1999). 
 91.  See generally Nuno Garoupa, The Economics of Political Dishonesty and Defamation, 
192 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 167 (1999).  
 92.  Garoupa, supra note 90, at 287; see generally Gabriele Gratton, The Sound of Silence: 
Political Accountability and Libel Law, 37 EUR. J. OF POL. ECON. 266 (2015). 
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libel regime that is more protective of reputation, she will be less likely to 
be exposed, and capable of recovering more of her losses in court if she is 
exposed, and therefore will expect to retain more of the benefit obtained 
through her wrongdoing. 
The publication of speech on political subjects has particular social 
benefits, if it is presumed that democratic decisions are improved by the 
public’s access to relevant information, in that it should enable citizens to 
self-govern more effectively.93  Legal reforms that aim to reduce the 
chilling effect are in part motivated by a desire to preserve these benefits.  
The opposite side of this coin is demonstrated by Garoupa’s analysis: where 
the chilling effect of defamation law on political speech is too great, less 
effective or more corrupt officials are allowed to go unchecked, and the 
long-term effectiveness of government may be eroded.  A defamation 
regime that is too restrictive of expression will also be more conducive to 
being weaponized because it will be easier or more effective for public 
figures to leverage libel claims to suppress criticism and thereby to hide or 
facilitate their misconduct.  We will return to discuss the effect of libel laws 
on public figures’ conduct below,94 after discussing in more general terms 
the economics of defamation and the chilling effect. 
B. The Economics of the Chilling Effect 
The following discussion puts the Sullivan Court’s critique of the 
common law of defamation into the language of economics.  Economic 
theory can explain the Court’s perception of the chilling effect problem and 
indicate why it considered the common law to have too great an impact on 
expression.  Our intention is to provide a basis for the discussion of the 
economics literature that follows, much of which assesses the decision in 
Sullivan and related reforms within this conceptual framework. 
Law and economics scholars have sought to explain how different fault 
standards affect potential litigants’ incentives to engage in activities that 
create a risk of injury to others.  One goal of this literature is to help 
understand which liability regimes are appropriate to induce socially 
optimal activity levels in given cases.95  Activity levels are socially optimal 
at the highest level of activity at which the actor’s benefit from increasing 
her activity is not outweighed by the social cost of the risk of accidents 
 
 93.  See Hollander, supra note 26, at 260-61; see generally, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, 
FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948). 
 94.  See infra notes 217-19 and accompanying text. 
 95.  STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 41-43 (2004). 
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imposed by that additional activity.96  Absent the risk of liability for 
injuring others, actors would increase their activity until continuing to do so 
offered them no benefit, regardless of any risk of injuring others, because 
the cost of those injuries is externalized.97  In general, assuming that courts 
are able to perfectly resolve disputes, a strict liability standard will be 
effective in optimizing activity levels.98  The strict liability standard 
optimizes activity levels because it forces actors to internalize the social 
cost of increasing their activity, by taking into account the risk of injury to 
others in the form of potential liability costs. 
In the context of defamation law, the relevant “activity” decision is the 
defendant’s choice whether to publish a potentially defamatory statement.  
As such, the standard economic analysis would suggest that publication 
incentives would be optimal under a strict liability standard.  In contrast, 
under a regime using a fault standard, publishers would be indemnified 
against liability for all statements published with the relevant standard of 
care and as such would have no expected liability costs to take into account 
when deciding whether or not to publish.  This would result in over-
publication, since any statement offering a marginal benefit to the publisher 
would be published, regardless of the additional risk of reputational injury it 
could create. 
However, there are two significant ways in which the law of 
defamation differs from this general understanding of fault standards.  
Firstly, courts are unable to perfectly resolve defamation disputes.99  Where 
courts are only imperfectly able to determine liability, identifying the fault 
standard at which activity levels will be socially optimal is more 
complicated.100  The imperfect resolution of defamation disputes by the 
courts makes publishers less certain of their risk of liability in respect of 
potential stories, and thereby contributes to the law’s chilling effect on 
legitimate speech.101 
 
 96.  Id. at 43. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (1980).  The 
defamation setting is most closely analogous to the category of accidents that Shavell refers to as 
“unilateral accidents between sellers and strangers.”  Id.  
 99.  This is also true in other areas of law, but courts may be particularly imperfect in 
deciding disputes relating to speech.  See Richard A. Posner, Free Speech in an Economic 
Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 25-26 (1986). 
 100.  See Steven Shavell, Uncertainty over Causation and the Determination of Civil Liability, 
28 J. L. & ECON. 587, 587-88 (1985); Eberhard Feess, Gerd Muehlheusser & Ansgar 
Wohlschlegel, Environmental Liability Under Uncertain Causation, 28 EUR. J. L. ECONS. 133 
(2009).  The focus of these papers is on standards of proof, rather than fault standards, but the 
basic point holds for the latter. 
 101.  Schauer, supra note 4, at 687-88. 
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Secondly, and more peculiar to defamation law, the activity being 
regulated – speech – generates significant positive externalities, to a greater 
extent than other risky activities.  The Consitution provides more protection 
to speech than to other kinds of activity in part because of the perceived 
social benefits it produces.102  These social benefits cannot be fully 
internalized103 by publishers for various reasons: for example, once 
information is in the public domain it is impossible to fully compensate the 
original publisher for its re-use by others.104  This aspect of defamation law 
featured prominently in the analysis of the Sullivan Court.  The Court 
believed that the common law strict liability approach, by forcing 
publishers to internalize the social costs of their activity without their being 
able to internalize its social benefits, would lead to over-deterrence of 
speech.105  As a result, society would lose the benefit of the over-deterred 
speech.106 
This was the essence of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Sullivan – 
the common law strict liability standard was inappropriate because it did 
not sufficiently account for the social benefit of the defendant’s activity.107  
The Court mandated a more relaxed fault standard to give greater 
“breathing space”108 to probabilistic statements about public officials, and 
thereby to avoid over-deterring publications that would, if true, provide a 
social benefit. 
 
 102.  N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266, 269, 271 (1964); see also FREDERICK 
SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 7-10 (1982); Daniel A. Farber, Free 
Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the First Amendment, 105 HARV. L. REV. 554, 563 
(1991) (noting the particular social benefits produced by political speech). 
 103.  That is, publishers cannot recover the value of these externalities by including it in the 
price charged to consumers. 
 104.  See Hollander, supra note 26, at 260; Farber, supra note 102, at 558-59. 
 105.  Bar-Gill & Hamdani, supra note 21, at 2; ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC 
CONSTITUTION 325-27 (2002); Farber, supra note 102, at 568-70.  As noted, our focus in this 
paper is on traditional media publishers – other publishers, such as citizen journalists and 
bloggers, may also be subject to the chilling effect of defamation law, but the effect may not 
operate in precisely the same way.  For example, research in England suggests that internet 
publishers are more likely to abandon stories because of libel law when they have better access to 
legal advice.  Judith Townend, Online Chilling Effects in England and Wales, 3(2) INTERNET 
POLICY REV. 4-5 (2014).  Traditional publishers may be more likely to self-censor because of their 
greater understanding of the legal risks of publication. 
 106.  Bar-Gill & Hamdani, supra note 21, at 2-3. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964) (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 
U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). 
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C. Verification 
The above discussion describes in economic terms the Sullivan Court’s 
belief that the common law strict liability standard over-deterred the 
publication of statements about public officials, and explains its reasons for 
attempting to increase publication incentives by altering that standard.  The 
Court believed that the social benefit of true speech required a more relaxed 
approach to liability than existed under the common law if socially optimal 
publication decisions were to be induced.109  But law and economics 
literature investigates not only defendants’ activity levels, but also their 
care levels, that is, the level of care the actor takes to avoid injury to others 
while carrying out the activity in question.110  The applicable fault standard 
in a given area of law can affect potential defendants’ incentives to act with 
a particular level of care, as well as their incentives to act at all. 
Economists studying defamation law have argued that the approach 
taken in Sullivan “overlooks the effect of liability on the verification 
decision,”111 that is, the steps a publisher takes to verify the accuracy of a 
statement before publication.  Verification is the closest equivalent in the 
defamation context to the concept of care used in the law and economics 
literature on torts. 
The effect of defamation law on publishers’ incentives to verify 
statements is potentially important given that the social benefit of their 
publications is clearer and more significant if they are accurate.112  As 
Hollander puts it, “once we have decided that defamation law must be 
tailored to accommodate the public need for information, it seems 
inescapable that we must also be concerned with the effect defamation law 
has on accuracy.”113  As such, several economists have sought to redress the 
omission of care incentives from the Sullivan Court’s reasoning: their 
analyses have been concerned with the law’s effect not only on the quantity 
of speech produced, but also on its quality.114 
Alain Sheer and Asghar Zardkoohi investigate the effect of the Sullivan 
ruling on both the incentive to publish and the incentive to invest in 
 
 109.  Bar-Gill & Hamdani, supra note 21, at 1-2. 
 110.  SHAVELL, supra note 95, at 41. 
 111.  Bar-Gill & Hamdani, supra note 21, at 2. 
 112.  Cf. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN 23 (Penguin 
Classics 2006) (1839) (arguing for the social value of false, as well as true, speech).  But, Mill’s 
argument is more persuasive in respect of mistaken opinions than false statements of fact.  
Frederick Schauer, Social Foundations of the Law of Defamation: A Comparative Analysis, 1 J. 
MEDIA L. & PRAC. 3, 10 (1980) [hereinafter Schauer, Social Foundations]. 
 113.  Hollander, supra note 26, at 269. 
 114.  Id. at 261. 
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verification.115  According to their analysis, both strict liability and the 
actual malice standard produce inefficient publication incentives: the 
Sullivan standard “induces too little self-censorship while the common law 
approach induces too much.”116  However, while the strict liability rule 
induces efficient verification of the publications that it does not deter,117 the 
actual malice rule induces less investment in verification than is socially 
optimal.  As such, under that rule, “the probability of truth of those 
statements that are published will be undesirably low.”118  Hollander, 
similarly, argues that the Sullivan fault standard “will result in lower 
accuracy than would be [induced] under negligence or strict liability.”119 
If true statements provide more value to society than false statements, 
then the social benefit of a statement increases with the probability that it is 
true.  Ideally, publishers would continue to invest in verification until the 
cost of additional investigation outweighs the benefit to society of the 
resulting increase in the probability of the statement being true.120  The 
actual malice standard under-induces verification because, once the low 
level of care required to escape liability has been reached, the publisher 
does not benefit from additional verification even if it would benefit 
society.121 
Other aspects of the Sullivan decision designed to increase publication 
incentives may also come at the expense of reduced accuracy.  For example, 
Baum, Feess and Wohlschlegel’s analysis of confidential sources’ 
incentives to leak information to the press suggests that the decision to 
place the burden of proving falsity on plaintiffs increases the amount of true 
information made public, but also increases the publication of falsehoods.122 
D. The Trade-Off between Accuracy and Quantity of Publications 
The above economic analysis implies the existence of a fundamental 
trade-off in the incentives produced by potential reforms to defamation law.  
 
 115.  Sheer & Zardkoohi, supra note 22, at 207. 
 116.  Id. at 223-24. 
 117.  Id. at 119-20. 
 118.  Id. at 223. 
 119.  Hollander, supra note 26, at 263. 
 120.  Sheer & Zardkoohi, supra note 22, at 215-16. 
 121.  Id. at 222-23.  The use of a fault standard may also induce a publisher to waste costs on 
verifying stories that it would be certain to publish anyway, to insure itself against liability.  
Manoj Dalvi & James F. Refalo, An Economic Analysis of Libel Law, 34 EASTERN ECON. J. 74, 
87 (2008). 
 122.  Ido Baum, Eberhard Feess & Ansgar Wohlschlegel, Reporter’s Privilege and Incentives 
to Leak, 5 REV. L. & ECON. 701-03 (2009). 
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Reforms designed to ameliorate the law’s chilling effect on true speech will 
also decrease its deterrent effect on false speech.  Conversely, reforms 
intended to prevent the flow of falsehoods will also prevent the publication 
of truths.  The Sullivan Court aimed to encourage socially beneficial 
speech, but it did so at the expense of encouraging the publication of more 
false statements causing reputational harm to individuals who would likely 
be denied a remedy for that harm.  Similarly, although to a lesser extent, it 
has been noted that the English Reynolds defence, by design, allows some 
false allegations against public figures to go uncorrected and 
uncompensated.123 
The existence of this trade-off makes intuitive sense: holding 
publishers to a more exacting standard of care will not only increase their 
expected liability costs, and thereby reduce their activity incentives, but will 
also impose the costs of meeting the required standard of care, making the 
activity more expensive and further reducing activity levels.  This 
conclusion also aligns with those reached in the legal and theoretical 
literature on the chilling effect.  The appropriate resolution of the trade-off 
is a more difficult question and will depend to some extent on the legal and 
cultural values of each jurisdiction.124 
According to the First Amendment scholar Frederick Schauer, “[t]he 
New York Times decision is, at bottom, a finding that an erroneous 
penalization of a publisher is more harmful than a mistaken denial of a 
remedy for an injury to reputation.”125  The Supreme Court has recognized 
this explicitly: in Gertz, Justice Powell wrote that “[t]he First Amendment 
requires that we protect some falsehoods in order to protect speech that 
matters.”126  Implicitly, its refusal in Sullivan to create an absolute privilege 
for statements about public officials127 recognized that, to some degree, the 
deterrence of falsehoods was socially beneficial.128  The Sullivan decision 
“contains no analysis of the circumstances under which self-censorship is 
desirable or tolerable,”129 but the Court adopted rules that suggest a strong 
preference for ensuring the quantity of speech over its accuracy. 
 
 123.  Jonathan Coad, Reynolds and Public Interest – What About Truth and Human Rights?, 
18(3) ENT. L. REV. 75, 76, 84 (2007). 
 124.  Schauer, Social Foundations, supra note 112, at 10. 
 125.  Schauer, supra note 4, at 709. 
 126.  Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974). 
 127.  N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293 (1964) (Black, J., concurring) (proposing 
an absolute privilege for such statements). 
 128.  Michael Passaportis, A Law and Norms Critique of the Constitutional Law of 
Defamation, 90 VA. L. REV. 1985, 2018 (2004). 
 129.  David A. Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEX. L. REV. 422, 428 (1975). 
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The English courts have also recognized this trade-off.  In developing 
the requirements imposed on the media by the Reynolds defence, the Court 
of Appeal reasoned that if standards of responsible journalism were set too 
low, they “would inevitably encourage too great a readiness to publish 
defamatory matter,” but if set too high they “would deter newspapers from 
discharging their proper function of keeping the public informed.”130  The 
English courts, while agreeing with the U.S. Supreme Court that the 
common law struck the wrong balance, have disagreed with the balance 
chosen in the U.S., opting instead for rules that place comparatively greater 
value on ensuring the accuracy of potentially defamatory publications. 
Economists differ in their assessments of the appropriate balance 
between the two sides of this trade-off.  Sheer and Zardkoohi suggest that 
the imbalance in favor of speech that was preferred in Sullivan “may be a 
useful second-best solution, because of the importance of the self-
government external benefit implicated by publications concerning public 
officials and public figures.”131  Michael Passaportis, on the other hand, 
argues that properly taking into account the social harm caused by false 
publications should lead to the conclusion that “any regime of punishment 
more lenient than negligence necessarily causes social harm.”132 
Some economists have suggested that this trade-off might be resolved 
by using reforms to fault standards and damage awards in combination.  
Oren Bar-Gill and Assaf Hamdani argue that socially optimal decisions 
with respect to both verification and publication can be induced if the extent 
of publishers’ liability in defamation varies depending on whether it would 
have been efficient to invest in verification before publication,133 and on the 
expected social benefit of publication.134  Manoj Dalvi and James Refalo, 
similarly, focus on the effect of both fault standards and damages on the 
media’s incentives to verify and publish stories.135  Their conclusions 
favour using strict liability, and varying the level of damages according to 
the externalities associated with the publication.136 
 
 130.  Loutchansky v. Times Newspapers Ltd. [2001] EWCA (Civ) 1805, (No. 2) [2002] QB 
783 at 809 (CA) [41]. 
 131.  Sheer & Zardkoohi, supra note 22, at 224. 
 132.  Passaportis, supra note 128, at 2030. 
 133.  Verification is efficient unless it would be overly expensive, or unless the initial 
evidence for an allegation is sufficiently strong to make such verification unnecessary.  Bar-Gill & 
Hamdani, supra note 21, at 3-4. 
 134.  Id. at 4.  This finding effectively provides support for using the actual malice standard in 
respect of statements on matters of public interest. 
 135.  Dalvi & Refalo, supra note 121, at 87. 
 136.  Id. at 85-87. 
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But it is difficult to assess the extent of the various positive and 
negative externalities caused by varying the quantity or quality of speech in 
such a way as to actually induce these incentives.137  In general, altering the 
level of damages awarded to successful plaintiffs will affect publication and 
verification incentives in comparable ways to altering fault standards.138  
Higher damages will promote accuracy at the expense of lower publication; 
lower damages will have the opposite effect.139  The difficulty of measuring 
externalities also suggests that the role of economic analysis in resolving a 
straight trade-off between quality and quantity may be fairly limited.140 
III. LITIGATION COSTS 
To this point, we have discussed the economics of defamation law and 
the chilling effect in a general sense, suggesting that reforms to the 
substantive law, such as those adopted in Sullivan and Reynolds, imply a 
trade-off between inducing increased activity and inducing increased 
care.141  Clearly, substantive reforms that are favorable to defendants, as 
well as incentivizing publication generally, should be expected to reduce 
the effectiveness of attempts by public figures to weaponize defamation 
lawsuits against the media.  Publishers will be less concerned about being 
sued if they are more likely to be able to defend the suit successfully.  But 
other aspects of the libel regime may have a more significant bearing on 
this particular issue. 
Arguably, the feature of defamation law that most effectively allows 
plaintiffs to weaponize claims against media organizations is the high cost 
of litigation.  In this Part, we discuss procedural features of the law of 
defamation, with a more explicit emphasis on their implications for the 
issue of weaponized lawsuits.  After first outlining the significance of 
litigation costs to the chilling effect, we consider the cost implications of 
the substantive reforms discussed in Part II above, and then turn to the 
purely procedural issue of the allocation of liability for litigation costs.  
 
 137.  Hollander, supra note 26, at 270; Passaportis, supra note 128, at 2027, 2031. 
 138.  Hollander, supra note 26, at 273-74. 
 139.  Id. at 273, 275. 
 140.  But see infra Part VI (discussing some possible negative consequences of choosing a 
balance as favorable to speech as that adopted in Sullivan). 
 141.  Our interpretation of “substantive” reform loosely refers to reforms relating to the legal 
tests against which the existence or extent of liability is measured.  We use the term “procedural” 
reform to denote reforms relating to the processes through which the substantive law is applied.  
The distinction is not clearly defined, and there is overlap between the two categories.  See Scott 
M. Matheson, Jr., Procedure in Public Person Defamation Cases: The Impact of the First 
Amendment, 66 TEX. L. REV. 215, 222-25 (1987). 
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Those discussions will be built on in Part IV, which discusses parties’ 
litigation incentives in the context of defamation law. 
A. Costs and the Chilling Effect 
The problems caused for publishers by the high cost of defamation 
litigation have been recognized on both sides of the Atlantic.  In England, 
Alastair Mullis and Andrew Scott argue that: “The problem with libel has 
always been and remains the harm caused by threats and bullying in the 
shadow of the law.  Such threats rely on the fear of the cost of embroilment 
in libel proceedings, not on the expectation that a case would necessarily be 
lost.”142 
These commentators consider the issue of litigation costs to be so 
important that, during the debates leading to the 2013 reforms, they 
declared themselves “highly sceptical as to whether the substantive law of 
libel contributes at all directly to the existence of the perceived problems” 
with the chilling effect.143  Only procedural reform would be sufficient to 
address those problems.  Mullis and Scott were by no means the only voices 
in this debate emphasizing the central importance of litigation costs to the 
chilling effect;144 the issue was also highlighted in Parliamentary 
Committees contributing to the debate on statutory reform.145 
Similarly, in the U.S., the attorney David Boies has argued that: “[T]he 
process by which [defendants] get to judgment, even summary judgment, is 
a very large and expensive process . . . that discourages some in the media 
from undertaking stories (or undertaking approaches to stories) they know 
 
 142.  Alastair Mullis & Andrew Scott, The Defamation Bill 2012: Missing the Wood (With No 
Excuses), THE INT’L FORUM FOR RESPONSIBLE MEDIA BLOG (June 6, 2012), https://inforrm. 
wordpress.com/2012/06/06/the-defamation-bill-2012-missing-the-wood-with-no-excuses-alastair-
mullis-and-andrew-scott/. 
 143.  Alastair Mullis & Andrew Scott, Something Rotten in the State of English Libel Law? A 
Rejoinder to the Clamour for Reform of Defamation, 14 COMMS. L. 173, 173 (2009). 
 144.  See, e.g., DUNCAN BLOY & SARA HADWIN, LAW AND THE MEDIA: FOR PRINT, 
BROADCAST AND ONLINE JOURNALISM 93 (2011); Mr. Justice Gillen, “Everything Should Be as 
Simple as Possible but Not Simpler”: Practice and Procedure in Defamation Proceedings, 63 
NILQ 137, 144 (2012).  Contra David Howarth, The Cost of Libel Actions: A Sceptical Note, 70 
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 397 (2011). 
 145.  CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT COMMITTEE, PRESS STANDARDS, PRIVACY AND LIBEL 
REPORT, 2009-10, HC 362-I, ¶ 115, 236-37; JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE DRAFT DEFAMATION 
BILL, REPORT, 2010-12, HL 203, HC 930-I, ¶ 26 (UK).  Despite the emphasis given to the issue of 
costs by these committees, the 2013 Act contained very little in the way of procedural reform.  
That omission has been criticized by commentators.  E.g., Alastair Mullis & Andrew Scott, Tilting 
at Windmills: the Defamation Act 2013, 77 MOD. L. REV. 87, 88 (2014); Howard Johnson, The 
Defamation Act 2013 – Reform or Tinkering?, 19 COMMS. L. 1 (2014). 
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may engender litigation, whether [or not] they believe they can actually win 
that litigation.”146 
Nevertheless, the cost of litigation is an aspect of the law of defamation 
that has to date remained under-theorized in the economics literature.  There 
are, however, two particular contexts in which the high cost of libel 
litigation could have a significant impact on economic analyses of the law.  
The following discussion begins with the impact on costs of substantive 
reforms, such as those adopted in Sullivan and Reynolds, before considering 
the different approaches taken in the U.S. and England to apportioning 
litigation costs between the parties to a lawsuit. 
B. The Impact of Substantive Reforms on Litigation Costs 
Both the Sullivan and Reynolds reforms primarily altered substantive 
components of defamation law.147  That is, their main effect was to reduce 
the likelihood that courts would resolve certain categories of defamation 
claims in favor of the plaintiff by changing the legal tests applied to the 
determination of liability.  The economic rationale for this kind of 
substantive reform is that it will reduce publishers’ expected liability costs 
in respect of a given publication and thereby increase the incentive to 
publish.148  If the expected cost of liability consists of the likely cost of a 
finding of liability (including litigation costs and damages awards) 
multiplied by the probability of such a finding, then reforms that reduce that 
probability will reduce publishers’ expected liability costs overall. 
However, one of the strongest criticisms of both reforms is that they do 
not sufficiently account for the potential cost of successfully defending a 
defamation claim.  If being sued for defamation harms a media organization 
in expectation even if the lawsuit is likely to fail, then it will need to take 
this into account in its publication decisions. 
One common criticism of the Sullivan actual malice rule is that it shifts 
the focus of defamation trials from falsity to the defendant’s conduct.  
Randall Bezanson notes that as a result of Sullivan, “[a]s a practical matter, 
the truth or falsity of the challenged statement is no longer pertinent to the 
libel action.”149  This shift can be criticized on the grounds that the veracity 
 
 146.  David Boies, The Chilling Effect of Libel Defamation Costs: The Problem and Possible 
Solution, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1207, 1208 (1995). 
 147.  A number of procedural reforms were also adopted in Sullivan.  See Susan M. Gilles, 
Taking First Amendment Procedure Seriously: An Analysis of Process in Libel Litigation, 58 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1753, 1755-56 (1998). 
 148.  See supra Section II.B. 
 149.  Randall P. Bezanson, Libel Law and the Realities of Litigation: Setting the Record 
Straight, 71 IOWA L. REV. 226, 230 (1985). 
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of disputed statements is probably what matters most in a defamation claim, 
both to the parties and to the public, and the focus on fault means that there 
is often no need for the courts to rule on this issue.150  But the shift in 
emphasis from the statement itself to the defendant’s conduct in publishing 
also has side effects that bear more directly on economic analysis of the 
law.  In particular, it risks substantially increasing the cost of defending a 
defamation action, whether the defendant is successful or not.151  Hollander 
argues that the problem with the substantive rules set down in Sullivan and 
subsequent cases is that they “were designed on the assumption that damage 
awards, rather than litigation costs, were the primary burden on 
defendants.”152 
Put simply, the presumption of malice at common law meant that the 
defendant’s conduct was normally irrelevant to liability.  It might in some 
cases be relevant to the quantum of damages,153 but in most cases there 
would be no need to enquire into the circumstances of publication or the 
defendant’s state of mind.154  Introducing these factors as relevant, or even 
central, to liability substantially increases the burden on litigants of, for 
example, gathering evidence about the decision to publish and presenting 
arguments as to how that evidence should be interpreted in light of the 
relevant legal standard of fault. 
In addition to directly increasing legal costs by increasing the 
complexity of defamation litigation, the focus on defendants’ conduct may 
also impose additional costs on media defendants through plaintiffs using 
the discovery process to gather evidence relating to the publication 
decision.  For example, publishers may not want the courts, plaintiffs, or the 
public to scrutinize their newsgathering processes too closely;155 or the time 
and labor of journalists and editors may be lost while they are engaging in 
the discovery process, imposing opportunity costs.156 
The Supreme Court has acknowledged these side effects of its Sullivan 
decision.  In Herbert v. Lando, the Court noted that “New York Times and 
its progeny made it essential to proving liability that the plaintiff focus on 
 
 150.  Id.; David A. Barrett, Declaratory Judgments for Libel: A Better Alternative, 74 CALIF. 
L. REV. 847, 855 (1986). 
 151.  Anderson, supra note 129, at 435-37; LEWIS, supra note 53, at 201. 
 152.  Hollander, supra note 26, at 271. 
 153.  Rookes v. Barnard [1964] AC 1129 (HL) 1221. 
 154.  See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. 
 155.  Jane E. Kirtley, Vanity and Vexation: Shifting the Focus to Media Conduct, 4 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1069, 1106-07 (1996).  
 156.  Gilles, supra note 147, at 1780. 
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the conduct and state of mind of the defendant.”157  The Court went on: “If 
plaintiffs, in consequence, now resort to more discovery, it would not be 
surprising; and it would follow that the costs and other burdens of this kind 
of litigation would escalate and become much more troublesome for both 
plaintiffs and defendants.”158 
However, the Court rejected the defendant’s claim to a privilege 
protecting against the plaintiff’s inquiries into the editorial process leading 
to the disputed publication.159  The Court explicitly rejected the defendant’s 
argument that the increased expense of the litigation process would 
aggravate the chilling effect of the law.160 
Similar criticisms were made of the English Reynolds defence.  Shortly 
after the House of Lords’ decision, it was predicted that the defence “may 
be dysfunctional [in reducing the chilling effect] if it makes libel litigation 
more likely, more protracted, and outcomes less predictable.”161 
The prediction turned out to be prescient.  Commentators argued that 
the defence was costly and difficult for media defendants to run, and that its 
likelihood of success was unpredictable.162  Trial courts were criticized for 
applying Lord Nicholls’ ten factors163 as a rigid checklist of requirements 
that defendants needed to satisfy to qualify for the defence, rather than as an 
indicative list of things to be considered in coming to a more holistic 
judgment on whether the defendant had acted responsibly.164 
The House of Lords agreed with these criticisms of the way in which 
the Reynolds defence worked in practice.  Just seven years after its 
Reynolds decision, it felt it necessary in Jameel v. Wall Street Journal 
Europe to “restate the principles” of the defence in order to encourage 
lower courts to apply it more flexibly.165  Andrew Scott has reported that, at 
the time of Jameel, the defence had succeeded at trial in only three cases, 
 
 157.  Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 160 (1979).  But see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
477 U.S. 242 (1986) (encouraging summary judgment on the issue of actual malice in defamation 
claims).  
 158.  Herbert, 441 U.S. at 176. 
 159.  Id. at 160. 
 160.  Id. at 176. 
 161.  Kevin Williams, Defaming Politicians: The Not So Common Law, 63 MOD. L. REV. 748, 
753 (2000). 
 162.  ANDREW KENYON, DEFAMATION: COMPARATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE 226 (2006). 
 163.  See supra note 74 for the ten factors described in Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd. 
[2001] 2 AC 127 (HL) 205 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 164.  Jason Bosland, Republication of Defamation under the Doctrine of Reportage – The 
Evolution of Common Law Qualified Privilege in England and Wales, 31 OXFORD J. LEG. ST. 89, 
90-91 (2011). 
 165.  Jameel v. Wall Street Journal Europe S.P.R.L. [2006] UKHL 44, [38]. 
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out of almost twenty in which it had been pleaded.166  Despite the Jameel 
judgment, the perception remained that lower courts were applying the 
Reynolds defence too rigidly,167 and the Supreme Court168 again felt it 
necessary to encourage a more flexibile approach in Flood v. Times 
Newspapers Ltd.169 
These criticisms led Parliament, in the Defamation Act 2013, to replace 
Reynolds with a broader statutory defence for statements on matters of 
public interest.170  But the extent to which this new defence will solve these 
problems remains unclear – particularly because the Explanatory Notes 
accompanying the relevant provision suggest that courts should continue to 
use the Reynolds factors when applying the new defence.171 
A more intense focus on defendants’ conduct in defamation litigation 
may also have implications for the press’s ability to rely on confidential 
sources to reveal information on matters of public interest.  Baum, Feess 
and Wohlschlegel analyse sources’ incentives to leak information to the 
press under U.S. and English defamation laws.172  They focus on the 
allocation of the burden of proof with respect to the veracity of defamatory 
statements, but the insight that sources will be more reluctant to come 
forward with information where the libel regime makes them more likely to 
believe that they will be identified in court is also pertinent here.  Clearly, 
discouraging sources from revealing true information is undesirable in that 
it prevents the public from being informed about important stories.173  If the 
reforms adopted to prevent publishers from self-censoring public interest 
stories increase the scrutiny given to the sources of such stories, they may 
risk chilling the flow of information before it even reaches the press.  In 
Jameel, the trial court’s rejection of the public interest defence was based in 
part on concerns about the veracity of the defendant’s claim to have had a 
number of sources, whose identities it would not reveal, corroborating its 
 
 166.  Andrew Scott, The Same River Twice? Jameel v. Wall Street Journal Europe S.P.R.L., 
12 COMMS. L. 52, 54 (2007). 
 167.  David Tan, The Reynolds Privilege Revitalised, 129 L.Q. REV. 27, 27-28 (2013). 
 168.  The House of Lords was replaced with the Supreme Court in 2009 as a result of the 
Constitutional Reform Act 2005, c. 4. 
 169.  See generally Flood v. Times Newspapers Ltd. [2012] UKSC 11, [80]. 
 170.  Defamation Act 2013, c. 26, § 4 (UK).  See supra text accompanying notes 57-58. 
 171.  Defamation Act 2013, c. 26, Explanatory Notes ¶ 35 (UK). 
 172.  Baum, Feess & Wohlschlegel, supra note 122. 
 173.  E.g., Ashworth Hospital Authority v. MGN Ltd. [2002] 4 All ER 193 (HL) 210.  But cf. 
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 693-95 (1972) (doubting the extent of the chilling effect on the 
flow of information that would be caused by requiring journalists to identify anonymous sources 
to a grand jury). 
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allegations against the plaintiff.174  It would not be surprising if the pivotal 
importance placed on anonymous sources in cases like this, such that 
revealing the identity of a source could allow a defendant to avoid the huge 
costs of liability, made potential sources more wary of revealing defamatory 
information to the press.175 
Reforms to the substantive law of defamation clearly have the potential 
to affect the cost of litigation.  When assessing a given reform proposal that 
seeks to address the chilling effect of defamation law by reducing the 
probability with which defendants will be held liable in court, its likely 
impact on costs should be borne in mind.  If the mechanism through which 
the reform operates makes the process of avoiding liability significantly 
more expensive or onerous for defendants, then the goal of reducing the 
chilling effect may be undermined.  Even if a publisher is less likely to be 
liable for damages, increasing the expense of successfully defending a 
defamation suit may reduce, neutralize, or even counteract the benefit of the 
decreased probability of a finding of liability.176 
Despite the criticisms above, commentators have argued that the 
impact of Sullivan and subsequent decisions has been to effectively 
neutralize the chilling effect of defamation on the U.S. press.177  If Sullivan 
has in fact been broadly successful in this respect, the most likely reason is 
that it reduces plaintiffs’ chances of recovery sufficiently to outweigh, on 
average, the increase in litigation costs and damages awards that came with 
it.  As such, despite these unwanted side effects, journalists’ expected 
litigation costs with respect to any given publication are still lower than 
they would have been under the pre-existing law.  This approach, as noted 
above, has its attendant disadvantages, in terms of the very low protection 
for reputation and decreased accuracy of publications.178  And, as will be 
seen in the following section, the financial threat of defamation suits against 
the media has not been entirely removed by the Sullivan doctrine.179 
If libel reforms, even those favoring defendants, make the successful 
defence of a defamation lawsuit sufficiently costly for publishers, then they 
present an opportunity for public figures to weaponize claims against the 
media.  This is obviously undesirable, as David Boies has argued: “A 
 
 174.  Jameel v. Wall Street Journal Europe S.P.R.L. [2004] EWHC 37 (QB); see also James 
Gilbert Ltd. v. MGN Ltd. [2000] EMLR 680 (QB) 700-01. 
 175.  But see Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd. [2001] 2 AC 127 (HL) 205 (appeal taken 
from Eng.).  “In general, a newspaper’s unwillingness to disclose the identity of its sources should 
not weigh against it” in the application of the defence.  Id. 
 176.  Schauer, Social Foundations, supra note 112, at 11. 
 177.  Anderson, supra note 49, at 865-66. 
 178.  See supra notes 83-93 and accompanying text. 
 179.  See infra notes 201-09. 
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situation in which well-heeled corporate, political or social interests can 
discourage reporting adverse to their interests or agenda, not by the threat of 
successful litigation but by the threat of imposing enormous costs even if 
the defendant ultimately prevails, should and does raise fundamental 
concerns.”180 
This is the subject to which we now turn our attention. 
C. Allocation of Litigation Costs 
It has been suggested above that substantive reform to defamation law 
implies a trade-off between increasing publishers’ activity and care 
incentives.  But defamation reform may not simply be a question of 
choosing a position on the spectrum between the quantity and quality of 
speech.  A variety of mechanisms could be employed to attempt to ensure 
the optimal balance, and each may affect incentives in different ways.  If 
mechanisms can be found that do not require such a stark choice between 
different categories of error – that is, mechanisms that are capable of 
reducing the chilling effect without simultaneously reducing the deterrence 
of falsity – then, intuitively, those mechanisms would be preferable options 
for reform.181  One possible avenue to explore is the rules governing the 
allocation of liability for litigation costs between the parties to a lawsuit. 
David Hollander analyses the effects of three different legal reform 
mechanisms on publication incentives and accuracy of reporting: fault 
standards, damage awards, and the apportionment of liability for litigation 
costs.182  He argues that using either of the first two of these options to 
increase publication incentives will induce undesirably low care incentives 
as a side effect, but sees litigation costs as a promising area for reforms that 
might avoid this trade-off between activity and care incentives.183 
Given the substantial impact that litigation costs can have on the 
media’s publication incentives, the rules used to determine who should be 
liable to pay those costs are obviously important.  Although there are 
complications to each, the basic rule differs sharply between the English 
and U.S. legal systems.  In the U.S., each party to litigation is, in general, 
liable for its own costs; in England, prevailing parties will normally be 
 
 180.  Boies, supra note 146, at 1208. 
 181.  Hollander, supra note 26, at 270. 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  Id.  Hollander also recognizes the failure of substantive reform to sufficiently deter 
abusive lawsuits (id. at 272), also discussed infra text accompanying notes 188-91. 
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entitled to recover some or all of their litigation costs from their 
opponents.184 
Typically, economic analysis of the effect of costs on litigation 
incentives suggests that the English rule is better suited to deterring 
plaintiffs from filing suits with a low chance of succeeding,185 although it 
may make these claims more likely to go to trial (as opposed to being 
settled) once they have been filed.186  Such plaintiffs expect with greater 
probability to be liable to pay the defendants’ costs in addition to their own, 
and as such their risk of suing is greater.187  However, by increasing the risk 
associated with litigation, the English rule can deter less wealthy or more 
risk averse plaintiffs, or those with legitimate but low-value claims, from 
filing suit.188 
Of course, the increased financial risk to plaintiffs under the English 
rule also cuts the other way: defendants who are held liable may be required 
to pay legal costs far in excess of the damages awarded to the plaintiff.  
This risk is illustrated by a recent case heard by the U.K. Supreme Court, 
Flood v. Times Newspapers Ltd.189  The plaintiff in that case was awarded 
£60,000 in damages in respect of the continued publication of defamatory 
allegations on the Times’s website after it had been informed that they were 
false.190  In addition, however, the defendant was ordered to pay the 
plaintiff’s litigation costs of approximately £1.6m.191 
Clearly, the English costs rule can impose enormous financial burdens 
on unsuccessful defendants.  Its main benefit is that it can reduce the burden 
on successful defendants and, in theory, thereby reduce the chilling of true 
speech.  Assuming that courts are sufficiently able to distinguish between 
suits brought in respect of true and false statements, so that plaintiffs in the 
latter have a lower prospect of success, the English rule should decrease the 
risk of publishing true statements by making litigation less likely to result 
and less costly if it does. 
 
 184.  James Windon, Fee Shifting in Libel Litigation: How the American Approach to Costs 
Allocation Inhibits the Achievement of Libel Law’s Substantive Goals, 3 J. INT’L MEDIA & ENT. L. 
175, 180-83 (2010). 
 185.  Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative 
Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 59 (1982). 
 186.  A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel J. Rubinfeld, Does the English Rule Discourage Low-
Probability-of-Prevailing Plaintiffs?, 27 J. LEGAL STUD.  141, 143 (1998). 
 187.  Brandon Chad Bungard, Fee! Fie! Foe! Fum!: I Smell the Efficiency of the English Rule 
– Finding the Right Approach to Tort Reform, 31 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1, 37 (2006). 
 188.  Hollander, supra note 26, at 274. 
 189.  Flood v. Times Newspapers Ltd. [2017] UKSC 33. 
 190.  Id. at [14]-[17]. 
 191.  Bryan Heaney, Huge Costs Bills Had to Be Paid Despite ECtHR Decision, 135 CIV. P. 
B. 6 (2017). 
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Hollander analyses the two rules in the specific context of defamation 
law, and considers that the increased deterrence of nonmeritorious claims 
induced by the English rule “should result in a unambiguous social gain,”192 
given the chilling effect that such claims can have on speech.  As such, he 
recommends adopting the English rule requiring the losing party to pay the 
winning party’s costs, with some alterations designed to facilitate suits 
brought by plaintiffs with meritorious but low-value claims.193  Similarly, 
James Windon argues that despite the significant reforms to U.S. libel law 
aimed at reducing the chilling effect, the American costs rule “has operated 
to undermine the incentivizing effect that these substantive changes were 
designed to create.”194  He also recommends the adoption of the English 
costs rule in U.S. law.195 
However, even publishers that are certain of the truth of a given 
statement would still need to account for the possibility of an erroneous 
judgment against them when deciding whether to publish.196  The greater 
this probability of the defendant being found liable in respect of a true 
publication, the less effective the English rule will be in ameliorating the 
chilling effect.197 
Further, even where a suit is successfully defended, the English rule is 
inevitably imperfect in shifting all of the defendant’s costs to the plaintiff.  
One example of the imperfection of English cost-shifting measures is the 
case of British Chiropractic Association v. Singh,198 which was “widely 
regarded as one of the main drivers” of the 2013 reforms.199  Although the 
lawsuit was dropped by the plaintiff after an unfavorable Court of Appeal 
ruling on a point of law, the defendant reported that avoiding liability had 
cost £200,000 that would not be recovered from the unsuccessful 
plaintiff.200  For an individual defendant or a smaller media company, the 
prospect of losing this kind of sum to win in court – all the while risking 
 
 192.  Hollander, supra note 26, at 274. 
 193.  Id. at 274-76. 
 194.  Windon, supra note 184, at 191.  See also supra Section III.B. 
 195.  Windon, supra note 184, at 194. 
 196.  Schauer, supra note 4, at 695-96. 
 197.  It may also be the case that risk-aversion heightens the effect of this threat on media 
organizations.  Lili Levi has suggested that the “challenging environment in which modern media 
operate amplifies the hazards posed by lawsuits” brought to chill reporting.  Lili Levi, The 
Weaponized Lawsuit Against the Media: Litigation Funding as a New Threat to Journalism, 66 
AM. U. L. REV. 761, 765 (2017). 
 198.  British Chiropractic Association v. Singh [2010] EWCA (Civ.) 350 (Eng.). 
 199.  Descheemaeker, Three Errors, supra note 83, at 30. 
 200.  See Science Writer Simon Singh Wins Libel Appeal, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
1/hi/uk/8598472.stm (last updated Apr. 10, 2010, 2:04 PM). 
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even greater losses if the plaintiff were to prevail – might simply make it 
impossible to avoid caving to the pressure of threatened litigation, and 
suppressing or retracting important publications. 
If a plaintiff’s purpose is to weaponize a defamation suit to harass or 
punish the defendant rather than to prevail in court, then an unsuccessful 
suit is more likely to achieve those objectives under the American rule, by 
imposing the costs of defence on the media.201 Douglas Vick and Linda 
Macpherson suggest that, for this reason, the American costs rule presents 
the opportunity for libel litigation to be “cynically manipulated to further 
goals unrelated to the vindication of an unfairly maligned reputation.”202  
While the English rule is imperfect in a number of respects, the American 
rule makes it easier for plaintiffs to impose significant costs on the media 
by filing frivolous claims. 
D. Current Issues Relating to Costs 
The argument that the U.S. costs rule can facilitate weaponized claims 
against the media is illustrated by the concerns that have recently been 
expressed about third-party funding of lawsuits against media 
organizations.  Commentators have noted the potential for exceptionally 
wealthy individuals to weaponize civil claims against the media by funding 
lawsuits brought by others and pursuing them aggressively in a way that 
imposes huge litigation (and, potentially, liability) costs on publishers.203  
To date, the most high profile example of this kind of litigation is Bollea v. 
Gawker,204 in which a lawsuit brought by former wrestler Hulk Hogan 
against the media company Gawker Media was secretly funded by 
billionaire Peter Thiel, who was motivated by a desire to seek revenge 
against Gawker for having revealed that he was gay several years before.205  
The litigation eventually ended with the jury awarding the plaintiff damages 
of $140m and, as a result, Gawker was forced to declare bankruptcy.206 
 
 201.  See Douglas W. Vick & Linda Macpherson, Anglicizing Defamation Law in the 
European Union, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 933, 967 (1996). 
 202.  Id. 
 203.  See id.  
 204.  Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC, No. 522012CA012447, 2016 WL 4073660 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 
June 8, 2016); see Levi, supra note 197, at 771-72. 
 205.  See Levi, supra note 197, at 769-79. 
 206.  Paul Farhi, Gawker Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Protection, WASH. POST (June 10, 
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/gawker-files-for-chapter-11-bankruptcy-
protection/2016/06/10/45ef7420-2f2e-11e6-9b37-42985f6a265c_story.html?utm_term=.566ee 
3b8aedb. 
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Lili Levi argues that “Clandestine third-party litigation funding in 
media cases is likely to enhance the chilling effect of lawsuits against the 
press.”207  Similarly, Nicole Chipi points out that, in the context of third-
party litigation funding, the higher costs imposed by the American rule on 
successful defamation defendants mean that the cost of being subject to 
even meritless suits causes a chilling effect on reporting.208  As such, third-
party litigation funders intent on harassing media organizations or causing 
them financial difficulties can succeed in those aims without even needing 
to identify a plaintiff with a significant probability of prevailing.  Instead, 
they can employ a “death by a thousand cuts” litigation strategy, 
weaponizing a large number of meritless claims against a particular 
publisher.209  Even if the publisher successfully defends every claim, the 
costs of such repeated litigation could be crippling. 
The English press at present have separate concerns related to litigation 
costs in civil suits brought in respect of their reporting.  In 2013, Parliament 
enacted legislation that would make significant changes to the normal cost-
shifting rules applicable in English civil litigation, which were to operate in 
most civil claims brought against press defendants,210 as part of its response 
to the Leveson Inquiry into the unethical practices of some sections of the 
British press.211  The new measures were controversial and have not yet 
been brought into force, but in theory they could take effect at any time the 
Government chooses,212 and it has been urged by some to do so sooner 
rather than later.213 
The provisions, which are contained in section 40 of the Crime and 
Courts Act 2013, were designed to incentivize publishers to join a 
regulatory body that met a certain set of criteria considered to be necessary 
to ensure effective regulation.214  Their effect, subject to various 
 
 207.  Levi, supra note 197, at 784-85. 
 208.  Nicole K. Chipi, Note, Eat Your Vitamins and Say Your Prayers: Bollea v. Gawker, 
Revenge Litigation Funding, and the Fate of the Fourth Estate, 72 U. MIAMI L. REV. 269, 296 
(2017). 
 209.  Levi, supra note 197, at 785-87. 
 210.  Crime and Courts Act 2013, c. 22, § 40 (Eng.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/ 
2013/22/section/40/enacted. 
 211.  AN INQUIRY INTO THE CULTURE, PRACTICES AND ETHICS OF THE PRESS, REPORT, 2012, 
HC 780-II. 
 212.  The provisions can be brought into force, under § 61 of the Act, by an order made by the 
Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport.  See Crime and Courts Act 2013, c. 22, § 
61 (Eng.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/22/section/61/enacted. 
 213.  See Anna Doble, Leveson Hubbub, 28(3) ENT. L. REV. 84 (2017). 
 214.  The criteria are set out in the Royal Charter on Self-Regulation of the Press 2013.  
ROYAL CHARTER ON SELF-REGULATION OF THE PRESS, 2011 (Eng.), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/ 
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complications, would be to make the allocation of costs in claims against 
the press dependent not on the outcome of the litigation, but on whether or 
not the defendant was a member of such a regulator.215  Defendants that 
were not members of an approved regulator would normally be liable to pay 
the costs of both parties regardless of the outcome of litigation, whereas 
defendants that were members of an approved regulator would be entitled to 
recover their costs from the plaintiff, again regardless of the outcome of the 
trial.216  The incentive that this would create to join an approved regulator is 
clear.  But the Independent Press Standards Organisation, which regulates a 
large majority of the British press, has stated that it will not seek 
approval.217  As such, bringing section 40 into force would leave most 
British press organizations facing far greater litigation costs than at present, 
regardless of whether they succeed in court.  Intuitively, this reform is 
likely to significantly increase the chilling effect of threatened litigation. 
While these particular debates are too complex to be resolved here, 
they do make one thing clear: the huge potential cost of defending a 
defamation lawsuit is a substantial factor in the chilling effect that the law 
has on publication.  Although substantive reforms that favor defendants will 
go some way to alleviating that chilling effect, the financial risk of being 
sued can still place an undesirable chill on speech when publishers expect 
to prevail in court.  This has implications for the role that economic analysis 
can play in assessing defamation law: once it is recognized that the chilling 
effect is driven not by publishers’ expected costs of liability as much as by 
their expected costs of litigation more generally, the importance of studying 
plaintiffs’ incentives to file defamation lawsuits against the media becomes 
apparent.  Part IV discusses these incentives. 
IV. LITIGATION INCENTIVES 
If, as argued above, the cost of defending against libel lawsuits is a 
significant factor in the chilling effect of defamation law, then the factors 
that influence plaintiffs’ decisions as to whether to file suit against the 
media will obviously be important.  This Part considers those factors and, in 
 
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/254116/Final_Royal_Charter_25_October_2013_cle
an__Final_.pdf. 
 215.  Crime and Courts Act 2013, c. 22, § 40-42 (Eng.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ 
ukpga/2013/22/section/40/enacted. 
 216.  Id. 
 217.  Jane Martinson, Ipso Considers Arbitration Scheme Covering Defamation and Privacy, 
THE GUARDIAN (June 15, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2015/jun/15/ipso 
-arbitration-scheme-defamation-privacy. 
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particular, identifies features of defamation law that seem to incentivize 
public figures to file weaponized lawsuits against the media. 
A. Nonfinancial Litigation Incentives 
One significant way in which defamation lawsuits differ from those in 
most other areas of law is the peculiar prevalence of litigation incentives 
that are not financial in nature.  Bezanson, Cranberg and Soloski suggest 
that, in terms of the various incentives at play in libel litigation, “cost – at 
least in its conventional [financial] sense – is not determinative, and . . . 
nonfinancial considerations of an individual and ideological character may 
dominate the libel suit.”218  Their work on the Iowa Libel Research Project 
identified a range of nonfinancial factors that influenced defamation 
plaintiffs’ litigation decisions.219 
In common with the issue of third-party litigation funding discussed 
above, the prevalence of nonfinancial litigation incentives in defamation 
law may aggravate the chilling effect on publishers because, like plaintiffs 
who are bankrolled by the wealth of a third party, plaintiffs with high 
nonfinancial stakes are “not significantly constrained by the economic 
calculus familiar to traditional plaintiffs” when determining their litigation 
strategies.220  This, again, may be a factor in defamation law’s particular 
conduciveness to weaponization by plaintiffs.221 
Economic analysis can help to assess what impact the dominance of 
nonfinancial litigation incentives might have because litigants can be 
presumed to pursue litigation strategies that maximize their welfare even 
where the measurement of welfare is not limited to financial considerations.  
Ronald Cass, for example, attempts “to incorporate into an economic 
analysis the First Amendment claims that much more is at stake in libel 
 
 218.  Randall P. Bezanson, Gilbert Cranberg & John Soloski, The Economics of Libel: An 
Empirical Assessment, in THE COST OF LIBEL, supra note 22, at 21.  See also Boies, supra note 
146, at 1208. 
 219.  RANDALL P. BEZANSON, GILBERT CRANBERG & JOHN SOLOSKI, LIBEL LAW AND THE 
PRESS: MYTH AND REALITY (The Free Press & Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1987). 
 220.  Levi, supra note 197, at 785. 
 221.  The media’s publication incentives may also have nonfinancial elements: publishers may 
be motivated by “a professional ethic that encourages them to seek to inform the public, even at 
the risk of libel litigation.”  Anderson, supra note 129, at 434.  However, as Anderson points out, 
libel law should not be designed in such a way that the incentives it induces “rely on the press to 
subordinate economic self-interest to the abstract principle of free speech.  The only reliable 
method of maximizing discussion is to reduce the economic pressures that constrict it.”  Id. at 433. 
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litigation than the possible transfer of damage payments from defendant to 
plaintiff.”222 
In the course of this analysis, Cass makes an interesting argument 
about how the prevalence of nonfinancial litigation incentives might shape 
the impact of the Sullivan reforms.  The argument is based on his 
assessment that public officials, for various reasons, are in general likely to 
have greater nonfinancial incentives to sue for defamation than other 
categories of plaintiffs.223 
The effect of Sullivan and subsequent cases was to significantly reduce 
defamation plaintiffs’ likelihood of success at trial.224  One of the Court’s 
reasons for doing so, and for differentiating between classes of plaintiff, 
was to prevent the weaponization of defamation lawsuits by public officials 
seeking to silence criticism of their conduct.225  But, by reducing plaintiffs’ 
chances of recovering damages, Cass argues that Sullivan “promotes a shift 
toward increased use of libel litigation for other purposes.”226  In other 
words, making the financial prospects of a defamation lawsuit less 
appealing to plaintiffs will have a greater influence on the litigation 
decisions of potential plaintiffs who are more concerned about the financial 
impact of litigation.  As a result, “one would expect . . . relatively more 
litigation by those plaintiffs who . . . have substantial non-award interests at 
stake,”227 including by public officials. 
This is not to say that the Sullivan doctrine does not deter some public 
officials from filing defamation suits.  But the counter-intuitive implication 
of Cass’s analysis is that the reduced likelihood of success for plaintiffs at 
trial will have a smaller deterrent effect on the number of lawsuits brought 
by public officials than on the number brought by other plaintiffs, despite 
the potential abuse of libel laws by public officials having particularly 
concerned the Sullivan Court. 
B. Repeated Litigation Games 
The existing economics literature on defamation law shares a 
significant feature with the majority of law and economics scholarship on 
 
 222.  Ronald A. Cass, Principle and Interest in Libel Law after New York Times: An Incentive 
Analysis, in THE COST OF LIBEL, supra note 22, at 73. 
 223.  Id. at 84-91. 
 224.  David A. Anderson, Defamation and Privacy: An American Perspective, in SIMON 
DEAKIN, ANGUS JOHNSTON & BASIL MARKESINIS, MARKESINIS AND DEAKIN’S TORT LAW 873 
(6th ed. 2008). 
 225.  See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text. 
 226.  Cass, supra note 222, at 80; see also Hollander, supra note 26, at 272. 
 227.  Cass, supra note 222, at 80. 
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litigation incentives: defamation litigation is treated as a one-off event.  A 
plaintiff and a defendant compete with no prior knowledge of each other’s 
litigation behavior and no expectation that they will meet in court again in 
the future.  This structure makes sense when analysing areas of law 
involving encounters between perfect strangers: for example, drivers would 
not be expected to be familiar with the previous behavior of the road users 
around them when deciding on the level of care they should use while 
driving.  But this is not always an accurate reflection of defamation 
litigation, where “frequently it is the most prominent members of society – 
public officials and public figures – who sue media defendants.”228  As 
noted by Richard Epstein, “it is the rare defamation action where the words 
spoken just happen to defame a person of whom the defendant has no 
knowledge.”229  In a substantial proportion of defamation cases – those 
brought by public figures – the defendant can reasonably be assumed to 
have some knowledge of the plaintiff’s previous litigation behavior when 
making publication decisions.  These cases are also those in which the 
chilling of legitimate speech is likely to be of greater concern. 
The fact that libel litigation often involves repeat players has 
occasionally been noted.  For example, Cass identifies the fact that “the 
expected effect of [current] litigation on future suits involving [a repeat-
playing] party” will influence that party’s litigation incentives.230  However, 
his focus was on the institutional media – the defendant – as a repeat player 
in litigation, rather than on the public figure plaintiff.231  To date, neither 
plaintiff nor defendant has been treated as a repeat player in any of the 
models of defamation law in the economics literature. 
We introduce repeated play into a model of libel litigation, with results 
that are relevant to the issue of weaponized defamation lawsuits.232  The 
model consists of a series of steps, repeated over two periods, in each of 
which a public figure interacts with a different journalist.233  In each period, 
 
 228.  ROY L. MOORE & MICHAEL D. MURRAY, MEDIA LAW AND ETHICS 361 (Routledge 4th 
ed. 2012) (1994). 
 229.  Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 782, 
805 (1986). 
 230.  Cass, supra note 222, at 73.  See also Marc A. Franklin, The Financial Impact of Libel 
Reform on Repeat Players, in THE COST OF LIBEL, supra note 22, at 171. 
 231.  Cass, supra note 222, at 73-74. 
 232.  Acheson & Wohlschlegel, supra note 28.  See infra notes 217-23 and accompanying 
text. 
 233.  For clarity, the public figure is referred to using feminine pronouns, and the journalists 
using masculine pronouns (one of us flipped a coin to decide which player would be which 
gender).  
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the public figure chooses whether to engage in some wrongdoing;234 the 
journalist may, if he receives some evidence of wrongdoing,235 publish a 
story exposing it; and, if a story is published, the public figure chooses 
whether to sue for defamation.  We analyse incentives at each of these 
stages of the game: journalists’ publication incentives, as well as public 
figures’ incentives to engage in wrongdoing and to bring a lawsuit if 
exposed in the press. 
The driving force behind our analysis is that the public figure may be 
one of two “types,” and that her expected net benefit from suing differs 
depending on which of these types she is.  If she is a “high-type,” then her 
expected net benefit from suing is greater than it would be if she is a “low-
type.”  Different public figures may have different incentives to file 
lawsuits for a wide variety of reasons.  For example, a high-type public 
figure may have cheaper or more convenient access to high-quality legal 
advice, or may place greater value on the potential for a lawsuit to vindicate 
her reputation independent of its outcome, or to act as a punishment for the 
journalist.236  Conversely, the low-type public figure may place more 
emphasis on the nonfinancial disutility of a lawsuit, for example the 
anticipated stress of the litigation process.  We assume that the public 
figure’s type is her private information; that is, it cannot be directly 
observed by journalists.  The peculiar prominence of nonfinancial litigation 
incentives in defamation law makes it plausible that, in this area of law, the 
expected net benefit of filing suit would vary significantly between public 
figures, and that a public figure’s type would not be directly observable.237 
The central focus of our model is on one particular effect of extending 
the litigation game over more than one period.  A public figure deciding 
whether to sue for libel will take into account not only her expected benefit 
from the litigation in question (as is the case in existing single-period 
 
 234.  “Wrongdoing” here need not be defined with great precision, but can be understood as 
reflecting the legal standard for assessing whether a statement is “defamatory.”  In other words, 
“wrongdoing” would encompass any action by the public figure which, if publicly revealed, 
would lower her in the estimation of the community or deter third persons from associating or 
dealing with her.  Sim v. Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237 (HL) 1240; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 559 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 235.  We presume that this evidence may be a false positive (i.e. the journalist may receive 
evidence indicating wrongdoing even if the public figure has not done wrong) to reflect our 
concern with the chilling effect, which has to do with the deterrence of probabilistic statements on 
matters of public interest.  Journalist’s uncertainty about the veracity of his evidence, and about 
the possibility that a court will deem it to be false, is part of what drives the chilling effect. 
 236.  Some research suggests that a significant proportion of libel litigants (almost a third) 
have punishment of the press as a primary motivation of the decision to sue: BEZANSON, 
CRANBERG & SOLOSKI, supra note 219, at 79. 
 237.  See supra notes 182-85 and accompanying text. 
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models), but also the effect that her lawsuit is likely to have on future 
journalists considering publishing critical stories about her.  A journalist is 
less likely to publish a story if he believes its subject is a high-type public 
figure because he anticipates that type to be more likely to sue, and takes 
his expected cost of litigation into account in deciding whether to publish.  
In a game extended over two periods, a low-type public figure can induce 
the second-period journalist to believe that she is a high-type by suing in the 
first period.  In other words, she can develop a reputation for litigiousness 
that makes journalists less likely to publish allegations about her in the 
future.  Even if she expects to incur a net cost from suing initially, that cost 
may be outweighed by the benefit of deterring publication in the second 
period and the additional opportunity that this deterrence would offer her to 
benefit from wrongdoing without being exposed. 
The model thus accommodates the intuitively plausible idea that a 
public figure may have an incentive to bring negative-value defamation 
suits against the media to establish a reputation for litigiousness that may 
deter journalists from criticizing her conduct in the future.  Given the high 
cost of defending a defamation suit, Hollander argues that “it seems 
implausible that [the media] do not take into account the risk of being sued 
when deciding what to publish.”238  Similarly, it seems implausible that 
potential plaintiffs would not anticipate this; and, indeed, “plaintiffs with a 
continued interest in discouraging public criticisms of them have made very 
frequent use of the nuisance value of the defamation laws.”239  These 
claims, brought in part to deter future publications about the plaintiff’s 
conduct, could be considered to be a kind of weaponized defamation 
lawsuit. 
The notion of an incentive to appear litigious driving public figures to 
file negative-value defamation suits against media defendants fits with a 
range of anecdotal evidence, as well as with intuition.  Evidence from 
England, pre-dating the 2013 reforms, suggested that some publishers based 
their editorial decisions partly on the perceived litigiousness of the subjects 
of stories, being aware of “individuals or groups or kinds of material where 
they or their newspaper ‘had to be extra careful.’”240  The names of certain 
individuals appear relatively frequently in discussions of notorious libel 
litigants.241  Most prominent is Robert Maxwell, the former owner of the 
Mirror Group newspaper company.  Maxwell’s biographer Tom Bower 
 
 238.  Hollander, supra note 26, at 258. 
 239.  Id. at 266. 
 240.  ERIC BARENDT ET AL., LIBEL AND THE MEDIA: THE CHILLING EFFECT 68 (1997). 
 241.  See generally id. 
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(who Maxwell also sued for libel)242 noted that “[d]espite the millions spent 
in legal fees over the years, he . . . won few victories in the courts, yet his 
threats of litigation often served his purpose [of] silencing enemies.”243  
Even after Maxwell’s death, it has been suggested that “the English media 
continues to be sensitive about its coverage of particularly litigious 
individuals.”244 
Other individuals or organizations perceived in England as being risky 
to publish stories about have included the Police Federation, which funded 
a large number of libel actions brought by police officers in the late 
1990s;245 McDonald’s Corporation, which – again in the 1990s – had a 
reputation for litigiousness;246 the former owner of Harrods department 
store, Mohamed Al Fayed;247 and the Russian oligarch Roman 
Abramovich.248 
It is easy to imagine how being perceived as litigious by news editors 
in this way might benefit a public figure.  Studies drawing on interviews 
with journalists indicate that where individuals are “particularly 
litigious . . . editors are less inclined to take risks”249 in reporting on their 
conduct.  These studies suggest that, in making publication decisions, 
“British editors routinely considered whether the subject of the article was 
someone who was likely to sue.”250  If so, they “withheld items that would 
have been aired against someone who was less litigious.”251 
Similar research reveals that the picture is somewhat different in the 
U.S.: “Is there a Maxwell parallel in the United States – a particularly 
litigious individual who scares newspapers and stunts their coverage of 
 
 242.  See Bower v. Maxwell, 1989 WL 1720340 (C.A. May 8, 1989) (Eng.).  This citation is 
to a separate defamation claim brought by Bower against Maxwell, but Woolf LJ’s judgment also 
includes details of Maxwell’s suit against Bower. 
 243.  TOM BOWER, MAXWELL: THE FINAL VERDICT 78 (Harper Collins Publishers, 1995). 
 244.  RUSSELL L. WEAVER ET AL., THE RIGHT TO SPEAK ILL: DEFAMATION, REPUTATION 
AND FREE SPEECH 233 (2006). 
 245.  David Hooper argues that this “willingness to sue” produced a “chilling effect, 
particularly on provincial papers wishing to publish criticism of the police.”  DAVID HOOPER, 
REPUTATIONS UNDER FIRE: WINNERS AND LOSERS IN THE LIBEL BUSINESS 134 (2000). 
 246.  Id. at 153.  
 247.  See id. at 69. 
 248.  2 CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT COMMITTEE, HOUSE OF COMMONS, PRESS STANDARDS, 
PRIVACY AND LIBEL: ORAL AND WRITTEN EVIDENCE, HC 362-II, Ev. 101 at Q333 (2010). 
 249.  Russell L. Weaver & Geoffrey Bennett, Is the New York Times “Actual Malice” 
Standard Really Necessary? A Comparative Perspective, 53 LA. L. REV. 1153, 1173 (1993). 
 250.  Russell L. Weaver, British Defamation Reform: An American Perspective, 63(1) 
N.I.L.Q. 97, 108-09 (2012). 
 251.  Id. at 109. 
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him? The simple answer is no. . . . [The U.S. media] do not seem to fear any 
particular individual like the British media feared Maxwell.”252 
However, even in the U.S., the potential still exists for speech to be 
chilled where it concerns individuals known to be particularly litigious.  For 
example, towards the end of the 2016 presidential election campaign, a 
slightly bizarre story emerged about the American Bar Association refusing 
to publish a report which concluded that Donald Trump was a “libel bully,” 
because of concern about the possibility that Trump would sue for libel.253  
As this paper was being written, the New York Times published a story 
about now-President Trump threatening to seek “substantial monetary 
damages and punitive damages” in libel against the publisher of a book 
about his administration.254 
In the 1990s, David Boies also identified: 
[O]rganizations like Synanon or the Church of Scientology which have, as 
a matter of deliberate policy, brought lawsuits to deter serious criticism. 
They won few, if any, actual judgments, but they also knew that people 
did not like to be sued, and once they made it clear that they were going to 
sue people that criticized them, there were going to be fewer people that 
criticized them.255 
There is no systematic evidence that the propensity of a given public 
figure to sue in defamation has an effect on the media’s publication 
decisions.  But both intuition and a reasonable amount of anecdotal 
evidence support the idea that plaintiff litigiousness is potentially important 
and that developing a reputation for being litigious could be of sufficient 
value to a public figure to incentivize the filing of negative value lawsuits 
against the media. 
 
 252.  Weaver & Bennett, supra note 249, at 1186. 
 253.  Mark Joseph Stern, American Bar Association Produces Report Calling Trump a Libel 
Bully, Censors It Because He’s a Libel Bully, SLATE (Oct. 25, 2016, 1:05 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2016/10/25/american_bar_association_libel_bully_report_
on_donald_trump_is_censored.html.  The report itself is available at http://www.medialaw.org/ 
index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=3470. 
 254.  Peter Baker, After Trump Seeks to Block Book, Publisher Hastens Release, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/04/us/politics/trump-threatens-sue-fire-fury-
publisher.html.  Trump also filed a defamation suit in 2006 against the author Timothy O’Brien.  
Although the claim was unsuccessful on its merits, Trump told The Washington Post in an 
interview, “I spent a couple of bucks on legal fees, and they spent a whole lot more.  I did it to 
make his life miserable, which I’m happy about.”  Paul Farhi, What Really Gets under Trump’s 
Skin?  A Reporter Questioning His Net Worth, WASH. POST (Mar. 8, 2016), https://www.wash 
ingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/that-time-trump-sued-over-the-size-of-hiswallet/2016/03/08/ 
785dee3e-e4c2-11e5-b0fd-073d5930a7b7_story.html?utm_term=.e6e434afd3ce. 
 255.  Boies, supra note 146, at 1209. 
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C. Implications of the Litigiousness Incentive 
Analysis of the litigation model described above provides support for 
many of the insights generated by previous economic analyses of 
defamation law.  It also suggests that some of the incentive effects 
discussed above may be intensified when libel litigation is recognized as 
involving repeated interactions rather than one-off disputes. 
Firstly, and most simply, the incentive to appear litigious on which our 
model focuses, which arises from the repeating nature of libel litigation, 
aggravates the general chilling effect of defamation law.  Journalists’ 
anticipation of the litigation incentives of public figures, even those for 
whom a lawsuit has a negative financial value, leads them not to publish 
stories that they otherwise would. 
The litigiousness incentive also affects public figures’ wrongdoing 
incentives, through a similar mechanism to that analysed by Nuno 
Garoupa.256  Libel laws that induce a greater incentive to appear litigious 
will also induce a correspondingly greater incentive to do wrong.  In part, 
this is because a public figure pursues a reputation for litigiousness in order 
to decrease the likelihood that journalists will publish defamatory 
allegations about her in the future.  This has the benefit of minimizing the 
immediate costs of future criticism, but it also means that she is less likely 
to be exposed if she engages in wrongdoing, thereby decreasing the risk 
associated with misconduct.  As such, in some circumstances, the incentive 
to appear litigious will induce more wrongdoing from public figures, as 
they anticipate being better able to hide that wrongdoing from the public. 
Robert Maxwell, who was discussed above,257 provides a concrete 
example that illustrates how a reputation for litigiousness could be used to 
hide significant wrongdoing from the public.  Vick and Macpherson note 
that Maxwell’s “staggering financial improprieties went largely unreported 
until after his death” and suggest that his “misdeeds would have been 
exposed earlier but for the reluctance of the British press to make 
allegations against him.”258  Maxwell’s weaponization of libel laws allowed 
him to continue to reap the benefits of his wrongdoing by decreasing his 
risk of being exposed by the media. 
It should be noted that, while these lawsuits could be weaponized to 
deter the exposure of a public figure’s future wrongdoing, they are not 
necessarily abusive or undesirable.  The litigiousness incentive increases as 
the costs imposed on publishers by being sued become less dependent on 
 
 256.  See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text. 
 257.  See supra notes 203-05 and accompanying text. 
 258.  Vick & Macpherson, supra note 201, at 967. 
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the truth of their statements.  In these circumstances, the probability of 
being sued is comparatively more important to the publisher than the 
veracity of a statement and, as such, a public figure who chose to refrain 
from suing would expose herself to a greater risk of being falsely defamed 
in the future. 
D. Assessing Potential Reforms 
Substantive reforms favoring defamation defendants, such as those 
introduced in Sullivan, decrease the law’s chilling effect on publication 
incentives at the expense of reducing the accuracy of the statements that are 
published.  These reforms will, in general, disincentivize litigation against 
the media by reducing plaintiffs’ expected net benefit from suing. 
However, by significantly decreasing plaintiffs’ chances of recovery, 
the Sullivan decision leads to a higher proportion of suits being brought by 
plaintiffs for whom nonfinancial litigation incentives are dominant.259  Our 
analysis suggests that reforms that have this effect would also increase the 
incentive to appear litigious, because they would increase the difference 
between the expected benefit of litigation for high- and low-type plaintiffs.  
In other words, substantive reforms like Sullivan that reduce the probability 
of plaintiffs prevailing disproportionately deter lawsuits from being filed by 
plaintiffs who care sufficiently about obtaining financial compensation for 
their injuries.  These reforms will be less effective at deterring lawsuits 
from being filed by plaintiffs with other motivations.  Those other 
motivations need not necessarily be undesirable, but could include 
plaintiffs’ hopes of suppressing legitimate criticism of their conduct in the 
future. 
The litigiousness incentive is driven by the media’s anticipation of the 
cost of being sued and so will be more extreme when defendants’ litigation 
costs are high.  The preceding analysis suggests that the American costs 
rule can facilitate weaponized lawsuits against the media:260 when 
“defendants must bear their costs even if they win, libel litigation is an 
effective tool to harass the press.”261  Our model suggests that the rule also 
aggravates the litigiousness incentive specifically because, by allowing 
plaintiffs to impose substantial costs on publishers through both meritorious 
and nonmeritorious claims, the probability of being sued over a statement 
assumes greater importance to the publication decision than the likely 
outcome of the lawsuit. To the extent that the outcome of litigation is 
 
 259.  See supra notes 187-90 and accompanying text. 
 260.  See supra notes 169-75 and accompanying text. 
 261.  Hollander, supra note 26, at 266. 
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determined by the veracity of the statement, this implies that the publication 
decision will be driven more by the likelihood of a lawsuit than by the 
probability that the publisher’s statement is true.262  As such, a reputation 
for litigiousness has a greater deterrent effect on publication under the 
American costs rule. 
The most effective way to reduce the litigiousness incentive would be 
through reforms that better distinguish between true and false publications.  
Where defendants’ litigation outcomes are more closely linked to whether 
or not a statement is true, publishers’ anticipation of the likelihood of being 
sued will be comparatively less important to their publication decisions than 
their assessment of a statement’s veracity.  As described above, some 
commentators have suggested that adopting an English-style costs rule 
would achieve this objective.263 
It has been observed elsewhere that, although libel laws in England are, 
in substantive terms, more plaintiff-friendly than those in the U.S., “they do 
not seem to produce the level of self-censorship that American courts have 
assumed the common law of defamation would generate.”264  Our analysis 
suggests that part of the explanation for this may lie in the effect of English 
cost-shifting measures, which should reduce the chilling effect on 
publishers as long as they can expect to be successful in court if sued. 
But the effectiveness of the English rule in this respect relies on 
publishers being sufficiently certain that they will prevail under the 
applicable substantive law, because of the much greater costs imposed by a 
finding of liability.  The greater prevalence in England of both the general 
chilling effect of defamation law, and of specific instances of chilling 
caused by weaponized lawsuits, have both been revealed by empirical 
studies.265  This suggests that English law is sufficiently uncertain for 
defendants that publishers are chilled despite the effect that the cost-shifting 
rule should have.266 
In other words, the goal of substantive reform adopted in the U.S. to 
reduce the chilling effect on publication has been undermined to some 
 
 262.  Contra Andrew T. Kenyon & Tim Marjoribanks, Chilled Journalism?  Defamation and 
Public Speech in US and Australian Law and Journalism, 23 NEW ZEALAND SOCIOLOGY 18, 25-
26 (2008) (suggesting that Australian publishers’ concern over the litigiousness of subjects of their 
reporting “did not override” their concern with the accuracy of their reporting); but see supra note 
221 (stating that the law should not rely on journalists’ professional ethics to mitigate the chilling 
effect). 
 263.  See supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text. 
 264.  Anderson, supra note 49, at 866. 
 265.  See supra notes 210-12 and accompanying text. 
 266.  This uncertainty appears to have been a problem with the Reynolds defence at least.  See 
KENYON, supra note 162, at 226. 
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extent by the fact that the American costs rule allows the effective 
weaponization of meritless lawsuits against the media.  Conversely, the 
benefits that should result from the English cost-shifting rules have been 
undermined by the lack of certainty publishers face with respect to their 
probability of prevailing under the substantive law in England.  The 
implication is that both substantive and procedural measures are necessary 
to effectively address the chilling effect of defamation law. 
However, we would caution against the conclusion reached elsewhere 
that introducing cost-shifting measures to U.S. libel litigation could resolve 
the trade-off between publication and accuracy that is implicated by 
substantive reforms.267  Firstly, because plaintiffs in the U.S. are unlikely to 
prevail even in respect of false statements, introducing an English-style 
costs rule would aggravate the law’s disincentive effect on the verification 
of statements.268 
Secondly, as indicated by the experience of the English media, cost-
shifting measures are only effective if the legal process is sufficiently 
predictable to allow publishers some certainty about the outcome of 
litigation against them.  But the imperfect accuracy of the legal process is 
one of the main factors that contributes to the chilling effect, and gives rise 
to the trade-off between publication and verification incentives, in the first 
place.269  Given that the lower costs for successful defendants under the 
English rule are offset by the higher costs imposed on unsuccessful 
defendants, the chilling effect of uncertainty as to the outcome of potential 
litigation may be aggravated by the increased financial risk of erroneous 
judgments against publishers. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The chilling effect that defamation law has on legitimate expression 
has been recognized as a problem in a range of jurisdictions.  The imperfect 
ability of the legal process to distinguish true statements from falsehoods 
leads to publishers being uncertain of their potential liability costs, even in 
respect of statements that are probably true.  This risk of the erroneous 
imposition of legal costs for the publication of true statements induces 
lower incentives to publish than would be socially optimal, particularly 
where those statements are on subjects of public interest.  As well as 
inducing a general over-cautiousness from publishers, this uncertainty can 
 
 267.  See supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text. 
 268.  Windon, supra note 184, at 194. 
 269.  See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text. 
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also be leveraged by public figures who can effectively chill valid criticism 
of their conduct through the threat of a lawsuit. 
Most of the legal reforms introduced in response to this problem have 
altered the substantive law, increasing incentives to publish by making 
defendants less likely to be held liable for publishing probabilistic 
statements that turn out to be false, or that cannot be shown to be true in 
court.  These reforms, however, are likely to come at the expense of 
decreased incentives to verify statements before publication.  In other 
words, they are likely to increase the quantity of publications at the expense 
of the quality of public discourse. 
Reforms that focus on defendants’ substantive chances of success can 
also be criticized for failing to sufficiently acknowledge the impact of 
litigation costs, as opposed to the cost of liability alone.  Where reforms that 
make defendants more likely to prevail at trial also make the costs of 
defence more expensive, they may undermine their own effectiveness in 
mitigating the chilling effect. 
It has been suggested that changing the rules determining the allocation 
of litigation costs between parties to a lawsuit might avoid the trade-off 
between publication and verification incentives that is implicated by 
substantive reforms.  This approach should work to some extent, but the 
effectiveness of English-style cost-shifting measures is limited by the same 
uncertainty as to litigation outcomes that helps to create the chilling effect 
in the first place. 
As such, the task of designing a libel regime will require a choice to be 
made about the relative desirability of the incentives to publish statements 
and to verify them before publication.  This is a complex problem to which 
courts and legislators in different jurisdictions will propose different 
solutions.  Economic analysis can help to assess the effectiveness of those 
proposed solutions in inducing the desired incentives but has little to say 
about the underlying decision as to which incentives the law should seek to 
promote. 
On the specific issue of weaponized defamation lawsuits, at least where 
those lawsuits are clearly frivolous, the solution seems to be simpler: it 
should be easy, quick, and inexpensive for publishers to successfully defend 
libel suits.  Reforms that impose additional costs on successful defendants 
are likely to increase the desirability of filing suit to plaintiffs who are 
motivated by factors other than the prospect of prevailing in court. 
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VI. CODA: THE SOCIAL COST OF FALSITY AND THE “FAKE NEWS” 
PHENOMENON 
The subject of this Symposium has two component parts: “fake news” 
and “weaponized defamation.”  Our contribution has been limited to a 
discussion of the latter topic, but we will end our paper with a short section 
suggesting intuitive mechanisms by which the two phenomena may be 
linked.  In particular, our conjecture is that reforms to defamation law 
intended to address the chilling effect caused by weaponized lawsuits 
against the media may have longer-term implications that are relevant to the 
issue of fake news.  As will be seen, the analysis offered in this section is 
speculative – much more would need to be done to properly investigate its 
plausibility.  It also clearly fails to account for the full spectrum of the fake 
news phenomenon, focusing only on defamatory falsehoods about public 
figures.  Nevertheless, it offers some intuitive reasons to think that 
defamation reforms aimed at reducing the chilling effect may have 
unintended consequences on democratic processes further down the line. 
It was argued above that economic analysis may be capable of making 
only a limited contribution to resolving the trade-off between publication 
and accuracy that is implied by substantive reform of defamation law.  
However, some economists have disputed the Sullivan Court’s attitude to 
the respective importance to be placed on the social benefit of true speech, 
on the one hand, and the social cost of false speech, on the other.270  An 
intuitively plausible argument could be advanced that the tolerance of 
defamatory falsehoods in U.S. law, intended to preserve the social benefits 
of true speech, may in the longer term actually undermine those benefits.  
The argument, presented here mainly as a provocation, would be along the 
following lines. 
The U.S. law of defamation since Sullivan under-deters the publication 
of defamatory falsehoods by the media.271  This price was considered worth 
paying by the Court to better incentivize the publication of truths, and 
thereby to secure the self-governance benefits of free and open discussion 
of public issues.272  In the Court’s analysis, the harm caused by those false 
statements consisted of an increase in the number of reputational injuries in 
respect of which public figures would have no legal remedy.273 
 
 270.  See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 271.  See supra Section II.C. 
 272.  See supra Section II.D. 
 273.  See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964).  
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However, the over-publication of falsehoods may impose additional 
social costs that were not explicitly considered by the Sullivan Court.274  It 
is possible that, in the long term, the decrease in accuracy induced by the 
Sullivan reforms may contribute to an erosion of public trust in the media 
(or, as President Trump would have it, the “fake news media”).275  If this is 
the case, then the social benefit of encouraging the publication of true 
statements, which provided the rationale for tolerating excessive injuries to 
individual reputation, could be diminished: a public that is distrustful of the 
media is less likely to believe or be influenced by the stories it publishes.  
In other words, the self-governance benefits of increasing the flow of 
information about public figures, which was the main driving force behind 
the Sullivan decision, may in fact be undermined by the decreased accuracy 
of that information that is simultaneously induced. 
This line of argument could be extended, even more speculatively, in a 
way that may chime with the current political climate in the U.S. 
particularly, and which is lent support by at least one existing analysis of 
defamation law’s incentive effects.276  One of the justifications for 
protecting expression in defamation law is to safeguard the media’s 
watchdog role by preventing public figures from weaponizing the law in 
order to hide their misconduct.  But if reforms protecting expression 
contribute to a decline in public trust of the media as described above, then 
the reputational penalty suffered by public figures whose wrongdoing is 
exposed by the media will be less severe, because fewer people will believe 
the allegations.  As such, the possibility of exposure will provide less of a 
disincentive for the public figure to do wrong.  Reducing the chilling effect 
on publication, if it comes too much at the expense of accuracy, may in the 
long term increase public figures’ wrongdoing incentives. 
Michael Passaportis frames this argument differently, focusing on the 
role of reputation in maintaining community norms.277  He argues that 
social norms which are policed by reputational incentives require an 
effective mechanism for identifying norm-breakers; the mechanism that 
communities most often use is gossip.278  False rumors make that 
 
 274.  See Passaportis, supra note 128, at 2019-21. 
 275.  Hollander, supra note 26, at 269.  Of course, the problem of declining public trust in the 
media has far more complicated causes than just defamation reforms. 
 276.  Passaportis, supra note 128.  See also Blasi, supra note 89, at 586 (arguing against an 
absolute privilege for statements about public officials: “if the public knows that critics of official 
conduct are subject to absolutely no standards of accountability regarding the accuracy of their 
charges, these critics may not retain the credibility necessary to perform their checking function 
effectively.”) 
 277.  Passaportis, supra note 128, at 1986-87. 
 278.  Id. at 1994-95. 
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mechanism less effective by reducing the reliability of accusations against 
community members.279  In doing so, they reduce the probability or extent 
of reputational harm that can be expected to result from breaking a norm 
and so erode the incentive to abide by the norm.280  Although framed 
differently, this is effectively the same argument as tentatively advanced 
above.  Putting the argument in less abstract terms, public figures only need 
to be concerned about news coverage that the public will actually believe.  
If the incentives induced by libel laws lead people to put less trust in the 
media’s reporting, then public figures have less to fear from their 
misconduct being exposed. 
It is likely that mechanisms other than reforms to defamation law will 
be better suited to addressing the problem of fake news, given that the 
phenomenon is not limited to statements capable of attracting liability in 
defamation.  We offer no analysis of the potential effectiveness of any 
particular mechanisms.  The intention of the above discussion is simply to 
provoke consideration of the ways in which these two topics may be linked 
and to suggest that, when designing defamation reforms with the intention 
of addressing the weaponization of libel litigation, or the chilling effect 
more generally, it would be prudent to bear in mind the potential longer-
term ramifications of those reforms.  The structure of defamation law 
clearly has significant consequences on the nature of public discourse, and 
it is worth recognizing that some of those consequences may be 
unpredictable, counter-intuitive, or dysfunctional in the long term. 
 
 
 279.  Id. at 1997. 
 280.  See id. at 1994-2004. 
